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ABSTRACT
C loud computing is a contemporary model in which the computing resources are dynam-ically scaled-up and scaled-down to customers, hosted within large-scale multi-tenantsystems. These resources are delivered as improved, cost-effective and available upon
request to customers. As one of the main trends of IT industry in modern ages, cloud computing
has extended momentum and started to transform the mode enterprises build and offer IT
solutions.
The primary motivation in using cloud computing model is cost-effectiveness. These moti-
vations can compel Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) organizations to shift
their sensitive data and critical infrastructure on cloud environments. Because of the complex
nature of underlying cloud infrastructure, the cloud environments are facing a large number of
challenges of misconfigurations, cyber-attacks, root-kits, malware instances etc which manifest
themselves as a serious threat to cloud environments. These threats noticeably decline the
general trustworthiness, reliability and accessibility of the cloud.
Security is the primary concern of a cloud service model. However, a number of significant
challenges revealed that cloud environments are not as much secure as one would expect. There
is also a limited understanding regarding the offering of secure services in a cloud model that
can counter such challenges. This indicates the significance of the fact that what establishes
the threat in cloud model. One of the main threats in a cloud model is of cost-effectiveness,
normally cloud providers reduce cost by sharing infrastructure between multiple un-trusted
VMs. This sharing has also led to several problems including co-location attacks. Cloud providers
mitigate co-location attacks by introducing the concept of isolation. Due to this, a guest VM
cannot interfere with its host machine, and with other guest VMs running on the same system.
Such isolation is one of the prime foundations of cloud security for major public providers.
However, such logical boundaries are not impenetrable. A myriad of previous studies have
demonstrated how co-resident VMs could be vulnerable to attacks through shared file systems,
cache side-channels, or through compromising of hypervisor layer using rootkits. Thus, the threat
of cross-VM attacks is still possible because an attacker uses one VM to control or access other
VMs on the same hypervisor. Hence, multiple methods are devised for strategic VM placement in
order to exploit co-residency.
Despite the clear potential for co-location attacks for abusing shared memory and disk, fine-
grained cross-VM network-channel attacks have not yet been demonstrated. Current network-
based attacks exploit existing vulnerabilities in networking technologies, such as ARP spoofing
and DNS poisoning, which are difficult to use for VM-targeted attacks. The most commonly
v
discussed network-based challenges focus on the fact that cloud providers place more layers
of isolation between co-resided VMs than in non-virtualized settings because the attacker and
victim are often assigned to separate segmentation of virtual networks. However, it has been
demonstrated that this is not necessarily sufficient to prevent manipulation of a victim VM’s
traffic.
This thesis presents a comprehensive method and empirical analysis on the advancement
of co-location attacks in which a malicious VM can negatively affect the security and privacy of
other co-located VMs as it breaches the security perimeter of the cloud model. In such a scenario,
it is imperative for a cloud provider to be able to appropriately secure access to the data such
that it reaches to the appropriate destination.
The primary contribution of the work presented in this thesis is to introduce two innovative
attack models in leading cloud models, impersonation and privilege escalation, that successfully
breach the security perimeter of cloud models and also propose countermeasures that block such
types of attacks.
The attack model revealed in this thesis, is a combination of impersonation and mirroring.
This experimental setting can exploit the network channel of cloud model and successfully redi-
rects the network traffic of other co-located VMs. The main contribution of this attack model
is to find a gap in the contemporary network cloud architecture that an attacker can exploit.
Prior research has also exploited the network channel using ARP poisoning, spoofing but all such
attack schemes have been countered as modern cloud providers place more layers of security
features than in preceding settings. Impersonation relies on the already existing regular network
devices in order to mislead the security perimeter of the cloud model.
The other contribution presented of this thesis is ‘privilege escalation’ attack in which a
non-root user can escalate a privilege level by using RoP technique on the network channel
and control the management domain through which attacker can manage to control the other
co-located VMs which they are not authorized to do so. Finally, a countermeasure solution has
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C loud computing has revolutionized, the means of how enterprises developing and provid-ing IT solutions. It has become the leading standard for running IT infrastructures fromthe smallest to the largest organizations. It noticeably has evolved as a technology, to
the extent that large organizations such as Amazon, Microsoft, Oracle and Google have invested
to build large scale cloud infrastructure to provision services. The question raised by many
organizations here is, when and how to shift from their existing IT infrastructure to the cloud
computing model. Recent report generated by Cloud Industry Forum (CIF) [1] in 2016 indicate
that 63% of UK industries are planning to shift their entire IT infrastructure to the cloud in
nearby future. CIF conducted an interview of 250 senior IT professionals and business decision
makers and disclosed that 78% of UK organizations are willing to use the cloud. Its growth rate
is 53% since when the first research was conducted in 2016 and it was predicted that by the end
of 2018, this ratio would grow to 85% [2].
A strong benefit of using cloud computing to provision service is due to cost effectiveness,
flexibility and on demand resource allocation activation via leveraging virtualization technology.
The other advantage of adopting cloud computing services is that organizations can circumvent
the upfront cost and complexity of running and maintaining their own IT infrastructure, and
instead pay for what and when they use. [3–6]. Regardless of these advantages, Cloud computing
faces new challenges not found within traditional distributed systems and require extensive and




In cloud computing, security is a major concern for customers to adopt this technology and move
from conventional computing to cloud computing [4]. By outsourcing, users lose their physical
control over data or network when it is stored in a remote server and they delegate their control
to cloud providers [17], [18]. Despite powerful and reliable servers compared to client processing
power and reliability, many threats are facing the cloud which can utilize cloud vulnerabilities to
harm [19]. These threats may jeopardize data availability, data confidentiality by exploiting the
network channel or by escalating the privilege level [20].
1.2 Security Threats in Cloud
Cloud implementations often contain advanced security technologies, mostly available due to the
centralization of data and universal architecture. The resource pool leveraged in cloud computing
enables the cloud provider to focus resources on securing the cloud architecture. Cloud computing
has the capability to address a number of identified deficiencies of traditional architectures due
to its unique characteristics, but the adoption of this innovative architecture may introduce a
number of uncategorized threats [7].
Cloud security is characterized by three criteria of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
(CIA triad), and is a fundamental property of cloud service provisioning platforms. However,
the innate properties of cloud environments such as elasticity, dynamicity, and scalability pose
substantial problems towards ensuring security.
Elasticity is defined as “the degree to which a system is able to adapt to workload changes
by provisioning and de-provisioning resources in an autonomic manner, such that at each
point in time the available resources match the current demand as closely as possible” [8].
Resource allocation is constantly changing because of customer requirements due to which
it is difficult to provide secure cloud services. Because cloud providers implement return-
oriented programming (ROP) technique to add their resources and this ROP technique,in
turn, is vulnerable to attack [9,15]. Virtualization introduces complex interactions between
multiple virtual machines and applications sharing the same physical infrastructure. Due
to this sharing an adversary can launch side or network channel attacks on other co-
located VMs. The consequence of these attacks can jeopardize for other co-located VMs
in terms of their data and resources[9]. Cloud environments achieve higher utilization of
physical resources through the consolidation of workloads. However, this makes them more
vulnerable to threats resulting from unpredictable resource demands as well as operational
failures, such as hardware and software failures, unforeseen load fluctuations, and network
attacks [9,10]. In Cloud environments services may be provided by an assortment of
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heterogeneous platforms, and resources are shared between multiple VMs. Cloud systems
comprise of a number of on-site computer organizations that may have a large number of
hardware and software systems. Attackers can exploit VM infrastructure to ex-filtrate data
or conduct attacks such as DDoS. The main reason for such attacks is the inherent loophole
in the TCP/IP stack [10]. Additionally, a number of different cross-VM novel attacks have
been launched in recent times that implement polymorphism and metamorphism schemes
to avoid detection. In an IaaS cloud model, for example, data about a victim’s virtual
machines can be acquired and exploited; thus, assist attacks on VMs [11–13].
This thesis presents an analysis method and an in-depth analysis of large-scale cloud com-
puting environments to identify the vulnerabilities in the existing network and hypervisor
architecture of the cross-VM cloud computing model. Although, researchers have already iden-
tified a number of cross-VM attacks that exploit the network architecture [30] and hypervisor
[29]. But now these attacks are controlled by the security perimeter of the cloud platform. Cloud
providers are continuously enhancing their security features to secure architectures by introduc-
ing new and advanced service models or layers in the networks. As the most common challenges
focus on the fact that cloud providers place more layers of isolation between co-resided VMs than
in non-virtualised settings. Due to this, the attacker and the victim are often assigned to separate
the segmentation of virtual networks. This isolation is also vulnerable to attack. Malicious VMs
can circumvent this isolation to launch an attack in the cloud model. Such vulnerability need to
be secured as it can compromise the customer’s privacy or can lead to the disclosure of customer’s
sensitive data.
1.3 Research Problem
The investigation into the security challenges of cloud computing indicates that virtualization
facilitates multiple virtual machines to share the same physical infrastructure, this in turn
creates new forms of cross-VM network channel or privilege escalation attacks. The network
channel attack can compromise the customer sensitive data and in privilege escalation an attacker
having limited rights can perform the root operations to control other co-located VMs.
1.3.1 Research Goals and Questions
The main goal of this research is to investigate the implications of virtualisation on vulnerabilities
in the network channel of cloud computing and to suggest a mitigation solution for cloud security.
This goal can be further divided into the following more specific objectives.
Investigate the network architecture and their associated components for designing
a zero-day attack model to exploit a vulnerability in the network architecture of the
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cloud computing model. The key research questions associated with this goal are:What
are the potential roles of network components in enhancing the security of network
architecture of cloud computing? How does a network architecture look like and which
of its components is responsible for managing network traffic?
Investigate return-oriented programming (RoP) and associated techniques for the exploita-
tion of hypervisor to escalate the privilege level of non-root VM, and identify strengths and
limitations of this approach.
The key research questions associated with this goal are:
a)b What domain properties are most applicable to support isolation in the cloud?
b) How can ROP provide the insight necessary to help the exploitation of domain isolation
properties of hypervisor?
Evaluate the overall approach through real-world scenarios derived from the analysis of
literature and to propose a mitigation solution.
The key research questions associated with this goal are:
a) What are the appropriate methods and parameters to evaluate the proposed approach?
b) What are the potential loophole in the architecture that can be fixed by proposing
countermeasures ?
1.4 Research Methodology
This work adopts an experimental systems research methodology, with an iterative approach
that is based on quantitative analysis of real systems.
Experimental: Investigate the network and hypervisor architecture in cloud computing
to identify the vulnerabilities. To exploit the vulnerabilities, two zero-day attacks named as
TAP Impersonation and Mirroring and Privilege Escalation are created to iteratively test the
exploitation of individual network and hypervisor components in the architecture. A large-scale
analysis is used to study these architectures to make it more effective in a generalised manner.
Iterative: The proposed attack strategies are selected by the investigation of different tra-
ditional attack strategies. The investigation of these existing attack strategies such as ARP
spoofing, IP spoofing, poisoning, Row Hammer attack is helpful in designing the proposed attack
strategies to be eventually used, keeping in view the need for getting insight about the network
and hypervisor architecture for the deployment setups. The intuition behind investigating these
different attack strategies is the use of diverse baseline attack models that can be used for
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diagnostic and accuracy assessment as well. The process of identifying a final attack strategy
starts with the exploration of traditional attacks methods followed by proposing a new model.
The new model is then evaluated on deployed network and hypervisor architecture and further
examined using experimental methods for update and re-design. By following this iterative
process and further evaluation within the network and hypervisor architecture a final attacks
strategies are derived. A detailed experimental study is performed to check the feasibility of the
proposed attack strategies.
Quantitative: Furthermore, our research methodology follows a quantitative assessment
of real world scenarios in a real-time environment. A quantitative analysis is performed on a
large scale experimental setup of two major IaaS providers; the first one is open source cloud
platform i.e OpenStack and second is commercial cloud i.e Oracle Ravello System. For evaluation,
multiple co-located VMs of different categories are used as a representative subset of problems.
The real-time network traffic of these co-located VMs, running on different deployment setups,
are used for assessment of the proposed model.
1.5 Contributions
The major contributions of the work presented in this thesis are:
The architectural insight of a network system to design a cross-VM attack, combination of
TAP Impersonation and Mirroring, probe on public and private cloud computing model to
investigate its feasibility. Data privacy and security is a leading concern for providers and
customers of cloud computing, where Virtual Machines (VMs) can co-reside within the same
underlying physical machine. Side channel attacks within multi-tenant virtualised cloud
environments are an established problem. Security perimeter of cloud computing have
attempted to mitigate such attacks by preventing VM-to-VM interference on shared hard-
ware. However there is still a gap in network architecture that needs to be explored in the
cloud computing model.Design and implementation of new attack (privilege escalation) by
exploiting the most ideal subset of the existing code (RoP)identified and empirical evaluation
of performance. An adversary having limited privilege rights may execute ROP, establish a
connection with root domain by abusing the network channel and get the possession of tool
stack (root domain) which they are not authorized to access directly. An empirical study
to evaluate the proposed attacks in real-time cloud testbed and design the most suitable
countermeasures to block these type of attacks. Existing research proposes cross-VM net-
work channel detection algorithm [16], [17]. However, such approaches are insecure, with
attackers capable of performing network channel attacks which bypass these mitigation
strategies and thus launch attacks. The insight network architecture of cloud revealed that
there is a vulnerability within network component. Hence, the countermeasure solution of
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these attack is proposed by directly modifying the open source network code.
Additional contributions of this thesis are: A detailed study of state-of-art cloud attacks
techniques in different domains in general and more specifically in cross-VM settings. A com-
prehensive study about RoP and domain isolation properties of hypervisors. Experiential
insight about network and hypervisor architecture variations across different cross-VM
attacks.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 covers relevant background information for this research and provides a detailed
literature study on attacks in cloud model and specifically, discusses cross-VM attacks in cloud
environments. Chapter 3 discusses about the network architecture and how network traffic flows
in the cloud computing model. Chapter 4 describes the design of state-of-the- art impersonation
and mirroring attack in the context of real-time attack under various cloud platforms and
intensities. Evaluation of this attack also been proposed at the end. Chapter 5 describes the design
of a novel real-time privilege escalation attacking by exploiting Return oriented programming
(RoP) technique in conjunction with network-channel along with empirical evaluation of the











BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This chapter provides the background of the work presented in this thesis and investigatespotential security threats and countermeasure solution revealed in cloud systems. Thisis possible through discussion and evaluation of existing literature regarding cloud-based
attacks and the vulnerabilities discovered by researchers, as well as novel methodologies and the
designed architectures of prior works, which can help mitigate such attacks, and thereby help
improve cloud security. Security threats have been described in detail, comparing the proposed
methodology with state-of-the-art. The evaluation secure public, private, commercial cloud plat-
forms, and prior research work, related to the proposed methodology are also presented.
The main goal of this chapter is twofold: to review the existing threat model and to assess
the state-of-the-art attacks in cross-VM settings along with their countermeasures. To place this
work in context, the chapter also offers a broader perspective on security issues in virtualization
and their countermeasures.
Background Cloud computing, a virtualization platform, is an Internet-based computing
model [18]. In this model, cloud providers deploy centralized computing resources and environ-
ments at large-scale, and provision these resources to customers. Customers can conveniently
outsource their computation and data storage tasks to the cloud systems with great elasticity,
economically and high energy efficiency. Cloud computing introduces new features including com-
puting resources on demand, applications on demand, resource pooling andsssss broad network
access[19] to minimize the running operational costs of cloud providers, and deliver high-quality
services to customers. However, these features, in turn introduce new security threats to cus-
tomers’ computations and data. This dissertation designs new attack model and countermeasures
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that detect and mitigate security vulnerabilities in cloud computing. In this chapter, background
information and the attack vectors in the cloud systems are described.
2.1 Cloud Computing Definition
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [19] defines the concept of cloud
computing as follows: - Cloud computing is a model for enabling ’convenient’, ’flexible’, ’on-demand
network access’ to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction.
2.1.1 Essential Characteristics
According to NIST definition, cloud computing introduces several new key features as compared
to traditional computing models:
• On-demand resources: Cloud providers facilitate customers to hire computing resources on
demand, i.e when they need it. They introduce the concept of “pay-as-you-go” pricing model,
which charges customers depending on the duration and amount of computing resources
they use. This feature can significantly save customers upfront infrastructure costs, as they
save a cost of purchasing and maintaining physical servers [19].
• Broad network access: Cloud computing is an Internet-based computing model that can be
accessed over the network. Customers execute their computational tasks and store their
sensitive data to remote datacenters, and are able to manage them remotely. This feature
can provide great flexibility to customers as they can access the cloud services regardless of
their locations and the devices. They can also share cloud services with others remotely
[19].
• Resource pooling: Cloud providers’ computing resources are shared to serve multiple
customers using a multi-tenant environment, with different physical and virtual resources.
These resources are dynamically assigned and unassigned to customers according to their
demand. There is a concept of location independence in which the customers generally have
no control or information about the exact location of the provided resources but may be
able to identify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g country, state or data center).
Examples of resources include storage, processing, memory and network bandwidth [19].
• Rapid elasticity: Cloud providers offer scalable services to customers. At any time, customers
can scale up their computing resources when their computing needs increase, or scale down
by decreasing their computing needs [19].
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• Measured service: Cloud providers adopt different measurements to monitor and measure
the delivery of services. These measurements can price the cloud services in the “pay-as-
you-go” manner. They can also achieve resource optimization and analytical planning: cloud
providers can control automatic on-demand scaling and failure recovery based on these
measurements. Resource usage can be examined, measured and informed, offering full
transparency to the provider and customer [19].
2.1.2 Virtualization
Cloud computing structure are highly dependent upon virtualization technique. Virtualization
facilitates multiple operating systems (different or same) to run on the same physical server at
the same time [20]. Each Operating System (OS) experience the same level of abstraction for
utilizing the entire machine, whereas they share the same server physically. Each OS executes
within a Virtual Machine (VM). Virtualization is implemented by both software and hardware
support.
2.1.2.1 Software support
In the software layer, virtualization is attained by a special software called the hypervisor or
the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). This software contains variety of features [20]. First, it
virtualizes the physical hardware resources (CPU cores, memory, I/O devices, etc.) so that multiple
VMs can simultaneously execute on one physical server. Second, it offers strong isolation between
different VMs so each VM has its own CPU context and memory space. Third, it is responsible
to manage VMs’ activities, e.g VM launch/termination, suspension/resumption, migration, etc.
Virtualization are of two types [21]:
• Full Virtualization works at a higher privilege level than the OS. It facilitates guest
operating systems running on guest VMs. The guest OS can release the similar privileged
instructions and sensitive calls as those running on real hardware. These instructions
are then interpreted to executable instructions by the hypervisor (Binary Translation
virtualization), or such instructions are directly handled by the hardware (Hardware As-
sisted virtualization). The hypervisor entails two main features to facilitate and secure
virtualized environments (i) protections of OS-Independent Storage Management to provide
resources from unauthorized access and, ii) conversion of virtualized environments to allo-
cate physical computing resources to virtual environments. Despite all these features, full
virtualization provides numerous advantages that not only give benefits to the customers
in terms of privacy and security, but cloud provider also get benefits by reducing the cost of
infrastructure. These features include:
– Sharing of hardware resources between multiple users;
– Maintaining isolation between different users and from the control program;
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– Emulating new hardware to achieve improved reliability, security and productivity.
• Para-Virtualization is another type of virtualization technique in which the guest oper-
ating systems need to be amended to release special hypercalls to communicate directly
with the hypervisor. This is called OS Assisted virtualization. The main restriction of
paravirtualization is the fact that guest OS must be custom-made precisely to execute
on top of the virtual machine monitor (VMM), the host program that permits a single
computer to support multiple, similar configuration settings. However, paravirtualization
eradicates the requirement for the virtual machine to setup privileged instructions. Setting
up the instruction is a mean of managing unexpected or unallowable conditions, can be
time-consuming and can badly effect the performance in systems that deploy full virtu-
alization. Xen, a leading hypervisor, is an open-source software project that incorporates
paravirtualization.
Hypervisor can further be classified into two categories: (1) a Type-1 or native hypervisor
runs directly on the host’s hardware to control a privileged host VM and other guest VMs. (2)
A Type-2 hosted hypervisor runs inside an operating system (called host operating system). It
manages the guest VMs from the host operating system. Figure 2.1 shows the abstract structure























Figure 2.1: (a) Type 1 Hypervisor (b) Type 2 Hypervisor.
2.1.2.2 Hardware Support
Contrary to software, hardware is also aimed to facilitate virtualization and support the rapid
growth of cloud computing. First, with the expansion of multi-core processors, the number of
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processing units that can be integrated on the same server is increasing. This enhances the
cloud server’s ability to host more VMs simultaneously and improve resource utilization and
power efficiency. Second, leading processor vendors such as Intel VT-x [22], AMD-V [23], integrate
hardware virtualization extensions into their processors. These additions bring in new hardware
components, instructions and execution modes for the handling of virtualization functions. For
instance, Intel VT-x has several new functions [22, 23]. (i) VT-x enables two operation modes: VMX
root operation, a fully privileged mode and proposed for the hypervisor; VMX non-root operation,
which is not fully privileged and proposed for the guest VMs (ii) VT-x introduces a Virtual Machine
Control Structure (VMCS) that is used for each VM to manage and store its non-root operations
and VMX transitions (3) Intel VT-x uses the Extended Page-Table (EPT) hardware to support the
virtualization of physical memory and (4) VT-x introduces new instructions that is particularly
used to handle VMCS operations and memory management. AMD-V has also support similar
functions. These additions in hardware can significantly enhance the virtualization efficiency
and shows betterment in performance as compared to software solutions.
2.2 Cloud Computing Models
2.2.1 Deployment Models
Cloud computing offers different deployment models to provide cloud services [19]. These deploy-
ment models characterize different cloud environments and scenarios.
• Private cloud In a private cloud model, the cloud infrastructure is particularly designed
for a single organization. Computing needs of such organizations have changed dynamically,
or they demand direct control of the computation environment. Generally, the private
cloud system is configured behind firewalls under its organizational control, so it only
allows access to authorized users from the organization. Additionally, a private cloud can
be configured locally to the organization itself, or externally by a third-party cloud provider.
• Community cloud A community cloud is normally shared between different organizations
from a specific community having common interest (security, compliance, authority, etc.).
The overall cost is equally distributed by these organizations, so this model can be more
cost effective than private clouds. Analogous to private clouds, a community cloud can also
be implemented and managed internally by the community, or externally by a third-party
provider.
• Public cloud A public cloud offers its service for public use. The complete system is
normally shared between different customers. Such cloud model offers services under the
principle of “pay-as-you-go” model. Any customer with a valid credit card can pay to rent
services. This cloud model doesn’t give direct control to customers over the system. A public
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cloud model is usually managed and operated by a commercial cloud provider such as
Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, Google Compute Engine, Rackspace, Oracle
etc.
• Hybrid cloud A hybrid cloud offers the services of two or more clouds, delivering the
fruitful features of multiple deployment models. It facilitates the customers to integrate,
customize or aggregate its cloud services with other cloud model. For example, in a hybrid
cloud customer can merge the services of a private and a public cloud. The organizational
secret or confidential data can be stored in its private cloud and uses computing resources
from the public cloud to run application that depends upon the data. This is because
organizations do not want to store their sensitive data in public cloud model.
2.2.2 Service Models
Cloud computing is a model for facilitating ubiquitous, appropriate, on-demand network access to
a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications,
and services) that can be swiftly set up and released with negligible administrative work or
service provider collaboration [19] . This cloud model is based upon three service models. NIST
defines these three standard service models as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform as-a-
Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Figure 2.2 illustrates the designs of these
three service models at an abstract level. Components highlighted in grey are controlled by the
cloud provider while white components are controlled by the customers as depicted in this figure.
These services have been described separately.
OS

















Figure 2.2: Cloud Services Model
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• Software-as-a-Service In this service model, the cloud provider delivers applications
software to customers as on-demand services. The cloud provider handles the infrastructure
and platforms, configures different applications software on the cloud servers and provides
customers network accesses to these software applications. Through this approach, cloud
customers can have a right to access these applications directly through web browsers or
program APIs. Customers are not required to configure or install applications on their own
local computers. Well-known cloud applications include email, storage, social networks, etc.
By the implementation of virtualization in cloud model, the cloud provider is able to run
multiple copies of one application in different virtual machines to achieve scalability. In
order to fully utilize the resources, cloud provider can execute multiple different applications
on server [19].
• Platform-as-a-Service This infrastructure offers programming environments to cus-
tomers for running their applications. The cloud provider implements and provides com-
puting platforms and environments such as OSes, programming libraries and databases,
to customers, as a service in this model. Then customers can directly design, develop and
execute their own applications with in this platform, without the complexity of building
and maintaining the underlying infrastructure such as servers and OSes. Virtualization in
cloud model is responsible for providing context isolation and allocate resources based on
the application’s demands [19].
• Infrastructure-as-a-Service The cloud provider provisions an entire virtual machine
(OSes, CPUs, memory, storage and networking) to customers, so they do not need to pur-
chase physical servers or network devices. At the time of VMs launching, customers can
select the required computing resources. These selections comprise of number of CPU cores,
memory size, disk size, operating systems, etc. The cloud provider then allocates these
resources from physical host servers and boots the VMs with these required configurations
on the host servers. After the VMs are booted up, customers can remotely access them to
configure and execute arbitrary software inside their VMs. Customer can fully control their
VMs such as to suspend, resume or terminate their VMs at any time by sending the request
to the cloud provider during the VMs’ life cycle. Other than this, cloud provider can also mi-
grate customers VMs to other servers for energy optimization or fault tolerance. Currently,
the cloud provider usually adopts the live migration approach. This approach can migrate
the VMs without disturbing their execution. Migrated VM downtime in live migration
approach is near to zero and experience negligible performance overhead. Additionally,
customers are totally unaware about the migration of their VMs [19].
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2.3 Cloud Computing Security
Cloud computing security denotes to a broad set of strategies, technologies, and controls organized
to protect data, applications, and the associated infrastructure of cloud computing [24].It is the
main concern of enterprises when shifting its critical information to geographically distributed
cloud platforms and these platforms are directly not under the control of that organization. Addi-
tionally, traditional IT information system security procedures, security configurations, firewall
rules can help in reducing the cloud attack surface. The main security principles that protect
information assurance are confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization,
auditing, and accountability. These concepts are summarized in the following sections. Confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability are referred as the CIA triangle of information system security




Figure 2.3: CIA Triangle
2.3.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality refers to the inhibition of intentional or unintentional unauthorized exposure of
information or data. Confidentiality in cloud systems is linked to the domains of covert channels,
traffic analysis, encryption, and inference:
• Covert channels A covert channel is an unauthorized and unintended communication
path that allows the transmission of information. Covert channels can be accomplished
through timing of messages or inappropriate use of storage mechanisms [26].
• Traffic analysis Traffic analysis is another domain of confidentiality breach that can be
accomplished by analyzing the traffic patterns like volume, rate, source, and destination of
message traffic, irrespective of the fact whether it is encrypted or is in plain text. A huge
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traffic burst and an increased message activity can indicate the occurrence of a major event.
Mitigation strategy of traffic analysis contains maintaining approximately constant rate of
traffic and hiding the source and destination location of the traffic [27], [28].
• Encryption It involves in hiding original messages into some dummy message so that
they can- not be disclosed by an unauthorized user, even if they are captured. The effort
need to decrypt the message is totally dependent upon the function of the strength of the
encryption key and the robustness and quality of the encryption algorithm [27].
• Inference Inference is the ability of an entity to use and correlate information secured at
one level of security to disclose information that is secure at a higher security level.Inference
is usually connected with database security [27]..
2.3.2 Integrity
Integrity contains maintaining the reliability, accuracy, and dependability of data over its entire
life cycle . Data must not be transformed in transit, and pre-cautionary measures must be adopted
to ensure that data cannot be transformed by unauthorized people. These measures include file
permissions and user access controls. In addition to these measures, some means must be in
place to detect any changes in data that might occur as a result of non-human-caused events
such as server crash. Some data might include checksums, even cryptographic checksums, for
verification of integrity. Backups or redundancies must be available to restore the affected data
to its correct state. [28].
The model of cloud information integrity demands the necessity of the following principles:
• Data cannot be modified by unauthorized users or processes.
• The data must be consistent internally and externally.
2.3.3 Availability
Availability is maintaining the cloud data center or hardware resources, performing hardware
repairs immediately when needed and maintaining a correctly functioning operating system
environment. Providing suitable communication bandwidth and preventing the occurrence of
bottlenecks. Redundancy, fail over, RAID even high-availability clusters can lessen serious
significances when hardware concerns occur. Fast and adaptive disaster recovery is essential
for the worst case scenarios. Defenses against data loss or interruptions in connections must
contain random proceedings such as natural disasters and fire. To avoid data loss from such
incidences, a backup copy may be saved in a geographically-isolated location. Security software
such as firewalls and proxy servers can save against the downtime and unreachable data due to
malicious actions such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and network intrusions.Additionally,
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this theory assure that the security rules or models of the cloud system must be in working order
[28].
2.3.4 Cloud Security Services
Additional features that directly relate to cloud system assurance include authentication, autho-
rization, auditing, and accountability, as described in the following sections.
2.3.4.1 Authentication
Authentication is analysis or reconciliation for the confirmation of a user’s identity. It creates the
user’s identity and confirms that users are who they claim to be. For example, a user gives an
identity (user ID) to a computer login screen and then has to entered a password. The computer
system validates the user by authenticating that the password relates to the individual offering
the ID [19].
2.3.4.2 Authorization
Authorization refers to rights and privileges approved for an individual or process that enable
access to computer resources and information. Once a user’s identity and authentication are
recognized, authorization levels determine the degree of system rights a user can avail [19].
2.3.4.3 Auditing
Organizations adopts two basic methods in order to maintain operational assurance: system
audits and monitoring. These methods can be applied by the cloud customer, the cloud provider,
or both, depending on cloud architecture and deployment. A system audit is a one-time or
intermittent event to appraise security. However, monitoring relates to an ongoing activity that
observes either the system or the users, such as intrusion detection [19].
2.3.4.4 Accountability
Accountability is the procedure to define the activities and performances of a single individual
within a cloud system and to recognize that particular individual. Audit tracks and logs provision
accountability can be used to conduct review in order to analyze historical proceedings and
the individuals or processes associated with those proceedings. Accountability is related to the
concept of non repudiation, wherein an individual cannot successfully deny the performance of
an action [19].
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2.4 Attack Vectors in Cloud Computing
As discussed cloud computing provides new characteristics to facilitate enterprises and individu-
als to deploy IT infrastructure. However, these new characteristics in turn strengthen already
existing vulnerabilities and introduce new vulnerabilities. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
has recognized several well-known attacks that can compromise customers’ computations and
data in clouds [29]. These attacks have been categorized into different classification based on the
attack vectors. Figure 2.4 illustrates the abstract architecture of a cloud system with the possible
attack vectors. Here “x” indicates the possible attack vectors which are discussed as follows:
Figure 2.4: Potential Cloud Attack Vectors
2.4.1 Potential Attack Vectors
• Service interface: To access the services in cloud computing, a customer first requires
to register an account on the official website of the cloud provider. The customers need to
login into their account to use the cloud services. At this point, an attacker can penetrate
itself in a cloud system. As some cloud systems have not strong user identification and
authentication process, this gives a strong possibility to an attacker to hijack customers’
account and access or compromise the sensitive or private areas of cloud services. Secondly,
customers interact with the cloud services by using some User Interfaces (UI) or Application
Program Interfaces (APIs). If these interfaces are not configured properly or securely, an
attacker can easily exploit the vulnerabilities to hack credentials or compromise the cloud
services [30].
• Networks: Cloud computing allows customers and end-users to access its services through
networks. If networks are not properly secured, attackers can steal sensitive data during
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transmission. Additionally, attackers can launch different attacks on networks e.g, Denial-
of-Service (DoS) that fully utilize the cloud system resources. As a result, such attacks
prevent customers or end-users from accessing the data or applications [30].
• Cloud Administrators: The cloud administrators have been granted an admin role, a
privileged role, that supports management of the cloud infrastructure and services. Non
reliable or compromised cloud administrators can be the main source of high security risks
to the customers in the following ways. First, an unfortunate mishap or accident can occur
in a cloud system that leads to permanent data loss or leak of customers’ sensitive data.
Such mishap or accidents compromise of accidental data deletion by cloud administrators,
or a physical disaster such as a fire in cloud data center or an earthquake. Second, an
insider regardless have full access of the data stored in the cloud. He can easily misuse or
exploit the sensitive information of customers stored in the clouds, or compromise the key
management of cloud [30].
2.4.2 Virtualized System
Attackers can exploit system vulnerabilities within the cloud servers or virtual machines to
interfere in the servers or VMs to leak data or to take control of the entire server system or
to disrupt service operations. The attack possibility increases with the addition of hypervisor.
The hypervisor is a software that has a large piece of code and unavoidably consists of several
security bugs [31]. Attacker can exploit these bugs to compromise the server. Additionally, VMs
load the operating system which is called as a guest OS. Each guest operating system has its own
vulnerabilities that put the security of customers’ data and services at high risk.
2.4.3 Shared Infrastructure
The cloud provider can run multiple tenants or Virtual machines (VMs) on the same physical
server, that can share the same underlying physical resources. This sharing of hardware resources
and components may lead to new cross-VM attacks. In this shared infrastructure, a malicious
VM can launch some attack to ex-filtrate or leak sensitive data of other co-located VMs. It can
also exploit shared resources by launching DoS attack on host machines or main server so that
no other co-located VMs can access the physical resources.
2.4.4 Cloud Services
Cloud computing offers adaptable and low-cost cloud services. However, malicious customers can
exploit these services to launch attacks on cloud servers. These customers can first hire a large
amount of cloud resources through free cloud service trials or credit card fraud. Customers can
exploit the cloud resources to attack other customers, organizations or the cloud provider. Some
well-known attacks they launch include Distributed DoS attacks, large-scale email spam and
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phishing attacks, brute-force password guessing attacks, port scanning attacks, etc.
Despite the fine-grained services and strict configuration of security models offered by the
cloud providers, there is still potential for attackers to attack cloud computing model by exploiting
shared memory, cache, network channel, covert channel and other possible channels. In the
following section, the well-known attacks on cloud model and their countermeasures solutions
have been discussed.
2.5 Vulnerabilities in Cloud Computing
Traditional security threats such as the vulnerabilities in networks and the related operating
system attacks encountered in local networks and systems, are also applicable to the domain of
cloud computing. Cloud providers introduce new, advanced features in cloud computing, which
can in turn lead to new security threats to both cloud providers and consumers. Firstly, consumers
should trust cloud providers when using computational resources and storage devices. Security
perimeters, resource allocations and the management of cloud services are not handled or
managed by consumers, in fact these are strictly controlled and monitored by cloud providers.
Consumers are highly dependent upon cloud providers for securing their sensitive data and
computations. Secondly, cloud providers usually facilitate multi-tenancy infrastructure, which
helps reduce its cost and maximize resources usage. Due to this feature, multiple VMs belonging
to different untrusted consumers can be located on the same physical machine. This facility can
effectively enhance whole system’s resource utilization and can likewise reduce operational costs.
However, this feature can also bring new vulnerabilities to a cloud system, due to sharing of the
same hardware resources and storage devices. Thirdly, the cloud providers use virtualization
technique to manage resources more efficiently. This extra software layer can make systems
more complicated, and can add new attack vectors. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the
existing cloud vulnerabilities, and also to discuss countermeasures proposed in prior work for
mitigating these cloud-based vulnerabilities. In general, the classification of these vulnerabilities
and countermeasures are based on attack vectors.
2.5.1 Vulnerabilities in Virtualization
The infrastructure of cloud computing runs through the concept of virtualization, in which a
single physical system is assigned to multiple users at the same time. In such situations, there
are possibilities of exfiltration of data [32]. The introduction of a new layer in virtualization may
create a single point of entry for attackers, if virtual machine monitor is compromised.
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Three types of vulnerabilities on virtualization can exist which are as follows:
OS level virtualization Multiple guest OSs run on a host OS, that has the control and
visibility of each guest OS. Within this type of configuration, by compromising the host OS, an
attacker can obtain control of the entire guest operating systems running on the host OS [33].
Application-based virtualization Virtualization is layered above host OS. In this type of
virtualization, each VM has its guest OS that is running different applications. Application-based
virtualization also suffers from the same type of vulnerability as OS-based vulnerabilities [33].
Hypervisor or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) Hypervisor is a piece of code embedded
in host OS. Such a code may contain native errors. This code runs at a boot time of the host OS,
to control multiple guest OSs. If the attacker is successful in compromising the hypervisor, then
the entire controlled guest OSs can be compromised [33]. Well-known attacks on hypervisor are
given below.
In [33, 34] VM escape techniques were defined as being where an attacker creates a program
that executes a VM, whose purpose is to access the hypervisors’ root privileges by breaking the
isolation layer. Using VM escape, an attacker can access the host OS, bypassing the hypervisor
layer and other VMs running on the same physical machine. Virtual machine sprawl is another
challenge for cloud organizations. With virtual machine sprawl, the number of virtual machines
runnng within a virtualized environment increases due to the creation of new virtual machines
that are not necessary for business. Due to this, the new virtual machine will misuse the cloud
infrastructure [35].
Virtual machine can run on cloud computing which can be accessed through the Internet.
This indicates that their theft can take place remotely. Most hypervisors can store contents of the
virtual disk for each VM as a file, which allows VMs to be copied and run from other physical
machines. While this is a convenient feature, it is also a security threat. Attackers can copy the
VM over the network, or to a portable storage media, and then access data on their own machine
without physically stealing a hard drive [36]. Once attackers have direct access to the virtual disk,
they then have an unlimited time to defeat all security mechanisms, such as passwords, by using
offline attacks. The second security breach of the virtual disks discussed in [36], is how attackers
could corrupt or externally-modify a file while the VM is offline. This means the integrity of an
offline VM may be compromised if the host is not securely protected [37].
20
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The hypervisor manages the resource allocation between the host and guests’ machines. The
ultimate goal of the attacker is to compromise the hypervisor, in order to access the host OS with
the same privileges as that of the hypervisor [38].
2.5.2 Rootkit
Rootkit is a software or application-level tool that enables an unauthorized user to gain control
of a computer system without being detected. In Virtualization, cross virtual machines can
penetrate rootkits to other virtual machines, can crash hardware, or even can access sensitive
information. Rootkits have multiple capabilities, they are able to not only hide malware, but can
also conceal malware from analysis and detection processes utilized by defenders [39].
2.5.2.1 Rootkit in Hypervisor
The new guest OS in virtualization assumes it is running at the host OS, with the corresponding
control over hardware and resources. However, in reality there is no concept of the host’s existence.
A compromised hypervisor can also be used to create a covert channel for executing unauthorized
code into the system. Through this approach, an attacker is able to control any VM running on
the host machine, and can consequently manipulate system activities [33].
2.5.2.2 Hijacking the Hypervisor
If the rootkit can insert itself beneath the guest operating systems, it can control the entire system
[40]. This is exactly what rootkits achieve through different modes of x86 modern architecture,
as explained below. Figure 2.5 shows the x86 modern architecture, along with root-kit privileges
level.
• The User-Mode Rootkit resides in Ring 3, along with some other applications as user,
rather than low-level system processes. These can help in achieving objectives by replacing
a system’s binary applications, or by over-writing a Dynamically-Linked Library (DLL) [39].
DLL Hooking and Injection User-mode rootkits can exploit an API hooking by using
DLL hooks. A well-known user mode rootkit is the Vanquish rootkit [41], which redirects
Windows API calls to hide files, folders and registry entries [42]. This is accomplished by
injecting a malicious DLL into a target process, acting as an intermediary for API calls to
intercept requests for files, folders or registry entries, to filter them [39, 43].
• Kernel-Mode Rootkit These rootkits reside in Ring 0 which has the highest operating
system privileges level by adding some code or modifying the portions of the core operating
system, including both the kernel and associated device drivers.
Kernel-mode rootkits use a variety of techniques for subverting the OS kernel and AV
solutions.
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Figure 2.5: Privileges Level of Root-kit
Hooking Tables In modern operating systems there are a number of different tables which
can be used to perform lookups for different purposes, whether they be upon receiving an
interrupt, or knowing where a given system calls (syscall) is located. Altering the memory
descriptor tables offers an effective means of changing the memory mappings within a
target OS [39].
Routine Detours Routine detouring can overwrite a code segment with jump sequences,
either at the beginning (pro-log detouring) or at the end (epi-log detouring) of the target rou-
tine [43]. This helps maintain the original size of the altered routine, but not the checksum.
The overwritten sequence has been replicated at the appropriate location in the malicious
code segment, in order to ensure that the routine operates as expected [39].
Binary patching Binary patching can directly replace the binary representation of target
routine, often replacing system drivers or files altogether. This is often exploited by manip-
ulating the boot process, such as the Master Boot Record (MBR) and the Basic Input/output
System (BIOS), prior to OS initialization. One such example is the Vbootkit, which uses
the technique to create a custom boot sector code, in order to subvert the Windows security
mechanisms [39], [44].
Virtual Memory Subversion This is another additional form of rootkit, which demon-
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strates virtual memory subversion. The rootkit is called ShadowWalker, which is capable
of hooking and subverting virtual memory protections. ShadowWalker, when executed,
redirects read/write in order to hide executable code [45]. When a read/write attempt is
made on the hidden code region, the returned frame is diverted to an untainted one, while
allowing the normal code execution of the hidden code to continue. This is accomplished by
exploiting the split Translation Look, which is a side Buffer (TLB) of x86 architecture, and
de-synchronizing the two components in order to effectively filter executable code regions
from the read/write accesses [39, 46].
Virtual Machine Based Rootkits Virtual Machine Based Rootkits (VMBR) operate in
what is referred to as the Ring -1 layer, as its primary purpose is to allow the guest OS to
run with Ring 0 privileges, without affecting other guest OSs at that privilege level.
VMM Subversion Rutkowska [47] was the first to use this technology to subvert the OS
one step further. Here it inserted itself beneath the target OS, by utilizing these proces-
sor extensions and virtualizing the target OS in order to control all access to hardware
peripherals, context switching, memory management operations, and other components as
well [48]. These are widely referred to as Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) or Hardware
Virtualization Machine (HVM)-based rootkits [49].
• System Management Mode Rootkits These rootkits (SMMR) normally reside in Ring2.
The purpose of their development is to support low-level strategy that is developed through
the following methods:
BIOS and Firmware Rootkits This rootkit infected the Basic Input/output System
(BIOS) and PCI device firmware, at the lowest layer of computer systems [39].
BIOS and Bootstrap Modification This attack operates in real-address mode, acting as
a step towards subverting the OS before it has even been initialized [39].
Firmware Manipulation This attack allows for the remote injection and execution of
malicious code within the memory region, allowing Direct Memory Access (DMA) into the
target OS [50]. Performing DMA using this method allows for the exploration or alteration
of the target OS [39].
Hardware Interface These devices can be used to interact with a system through unin-
tended hardware vectors. One such example is a project at RMC, which had a primary focus
on exploiting unintended USB channels, in order to create two-way communications with a
target system [51]. This work used two different unintended channels for ex-filtrated data,
including a keyboard LED channel which used a combination of the Scroll Lock, Caps Lock
and Num Lock, as well as an audio channel which uses waveform files to communicate data
to the target OS [52].
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• Hypervisor Modification The security of a original hypervisor does not make any sense
if it is remotely controlled or modified by an external attacker. The new generation rootkits
allow an attacker to add an additional layer of hypervisor between the hardware and
software. The hypervisor takes control of the system and converts the original operating
system into a virtual guest on the fly. Comparaed to the software-based virtualization, this
type of hijacking does not require any restart, and it makes intrusion detection impossible
[33],[37], [53].
Table 2.1: Overview of Root-Kit Classification
Rootkit Mode Technique Process Placement/System
User-Mode Rootkit [39] DLL Hooking and Injec-
tion [42]
Exploits API Hooksing,




Kernel Mode Rootkit Hooking Table [39] Alters the memory de-
scriptor table
Routine Detours [43]. Overwrites a code seg-
ment with a jump se-
quence
BIOS/Memory Boot





Exploits the boot process
Redirects read/write to




the target OS to control










Operates in a real ad-
dress mode
Caps, NUM locks and
Audio channel to commu-
nicate data with the tar-




Allows for the remote
injection and execution




Interacts with the sys-
tem via an unintended
hardware vector
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2.5.3 VM Monitoring from the Host
In virtual environment, host machine can be considered as a system’s main hub. There are
some significances that allow host machines to observe and communicate with the running
of VM applications. Therefore, the host machine’s security is absolutely necessary. Different
virtualization technologies support implications for the host machine to interfere with VMs
operating in the system. The following are the potential approaches for the host to affect VMs:
• The host can perform the basic operations of VMs, such as starts, shutdowns, pauses and
restarts.
• The host can manage to observe and change resources allocated to the virtual machines.
• The host has sufficient rights to observe programs executing inside the VMs.
• The VM’s data is eventually stored on the virtual disk assigned to it, which the host machine
can access. Due to this, the host can undertake basic operations, such as copying, pasting,
editing, or simply viewing the content on this data.
More importantly, all communication to and from the VMs passes through the host, which
again allows the host to observe all communications of its VMs. In such cases, if the host is
compromised by some means, then the security of all VMs running on it is at high risk.
2.6 Related Work
2.6.1 Cross-Channel Attack in Cloud:
The aforementioned attacks are general threats to a cloud model. Following are well-known
Cross-Channel attacks in a cloud model that are close to our research.
2.6.1.1 Side Channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks are a class of physical attacks in which an adversary tries to exfiltrate
the sensitive information of other virtual machines. The use of virtualization can introduce new
security vulnerabilities, such as using cross VM-Side channel attacks, to extract information from
a target machine [54]. Some of the most well-known side channel attacks have been discussed as
follows.
The most effective cross VM-attack is an access-driven attack that exploits shared micro-
architectural modules like caches. In it, the attacker executes a program of code on the system,
which performs cryptographic operations. This program executed by attacker monitors the use of
cache to learn information about the key [55].
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A time-driven side channel attack is possible when the total execution times of the crypto-
graphic operations with a fixed key, is influenced by the value of key. The influence is exploited
by an attacker who can calculate such timing, in order to statistically gather information about
the key [56] [57].
A trace-driven attack is used to capture a profile of the cache activity. This states that the
attacker can obtain access to a running profile in which cache activity is monitored, and then
process it in order to extract the actual activity from the other profile content [56] [57].
2.6.1.2 Covert Channel
Covert channels are virtual communication channels between entities, which bypass the rules of
communication between them. Within the virtualization context, these give the attackers new
opportunities for communication, without being noticed by the VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor)
security module [58]. Therefore, the evolution of security threats arises within the context of
virtualization, and this need to be eliminated in order to obtain the full advantage of using this
technology.
In [59], researchers demonstrated a covert channel between the virtual machines on the Xen
hypervisor [60]. This was based on the fact that table that maps the machine address frames to
the pseudo physical frames of the virtual machine can be read by any guest VM.
Rutkowska [61] implemented a method of TCP/IP steganography called NUSHU, leaking
sensitive data from a compromised system through network packets generated from it. Murdoch
and Lewis [62] have addressed the various possibilities of covert channels, using TCP/IP header
steganography. It has been observed that this may be applicable within the virtualized scenario.
Murdoch and Lewis [62] described the header fields that make room for steganography and
developed the novel ‘Lathra’ method for a covert channel, using TCP ISN (an initial sequence
number). It also stated that an external warden, being a program or entity which can watch and
analyze data transfer between two systems or programs, cannot distinguish the ISN generated
by a machine from a manipulated TCP header. The recovery of encoded message is only possible
with the key used for generating ISN. This covert channel can be implemented between VMs,
and cannot be identified by the VMM [59].
It was hypothesized in [59] that a timing covert channel, which can be used to communicate
covertly between VMs and an attacker, can be used to leak information from possible VMs. To send
information covertly from a VM, TCP packets need to be sent at different time intervals. If a TCP
packet is sent at a specific time interval, the receiver then recovers message as bit 1 else bit 0 [63].
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A new network-based covert channel has been identified, using two sockets to transfer data
covertly. This can be used by an attacker, in order to leak information from a VM [59].
Indexes may contain a great amount of information regarding the data itself. They are
developed when the service provider receives data from the users, and decides to build indexes in
order to improve search performance. The users have no idea that their data is being used in this
way, which probably leads to the leaking of much more information. The index maps each term to
a set of documents which contains the term and is then queried by the searcher in order to obtain
a list of matching documents. The index host must then apply these policies for each searcher, in
order to filter search results appropriately. Since only the indexing host needs to be contacted in
order to completely execute a search, searches can be highly efficient. The compromising of index
host by hackers could lead to a complete and devastating privacy loss [64].
2.6.1.3 Attacks on Images
An attacker can attack OS images, in order to obtain sensitive information from other guest OSs,
and to crash the OS. Even if VMs are inactive, attackers can still manage to access them. This is
because the backend data center is permanently activated, and an offline VM is not considered to
be the powered-off home computer. Secondly, pre-built images need to be carefully scanned, in
order to circumvent legacy-vulnerable applications or trapdoors. As an example, AWS pre-built
images store builders SSH keys internally, meaning that all hosts using such types of images are
accessible by publishers [34].
As a common practice in cloud computing, cloud providers can create a template image of
an Operating System (OS), and then clone it to multiple machines. If there is some vulnerable
VM template images, then it may spread over many systems. An attacker can rent one of these
VMs and can accordingly analyze all important configurations, including administrative rights.
Another key issue they have raised is that an image can even be taken from an untrustworthy
source, which may provide back-door access to an attacker [65].
In [66], it was stated that the Guest VM can crash the Host OS, along with other guest VMs
hosted by it. Modi et. al [33] detailed that sharing VM images in the cloud introduces security
risks. The main concern of an image’s owner is confidentiality, for instance the possibility of
unauthorized accesses to the image. An image’s user is concerned about safety, such as the
potential of a malicious image corrupting or stealing the users’ own private data. For example,
instances running on Amazon’s EC2 platform can be easily compromised through the performance
of various attacks, such as signature-wrapping attacks, cross site scripting (XSS) attacks, and
DoS attacks. Through such types of attack, attackers can create, modify and delete VM images,
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and can change administrative passwords and settings that are put into instances with EC2
for S3 access. Images of pre-configured virtual applications and machines may be tempered or
misconfigured, before being uploaded [67].
2.6.1.4 Memory Attacks
An attacker can ex-filtrate data by attacking physical hardware, such as memory, storage units,
and others. Different cases have been described in this section, showing how successfully attack-
ers can engage different memory regions.
Once an attacker manage to co-reside on the same physical machine with a target, the next
step is to exploit the hardware resources, and extract sensitive data through cross VM-attacks. It
exploits hardware by using a technique for encoding information, thereby accessing the latencies
of a shared L2 cache [56], [68].
The hostile VM first writes continuous blocks of memory, and then releases those blocks. Later
the attacker will release those blocks, and the host VM will overwrite those blocks with its own
instruction set. The way the target machine writes to those memory blocks, after the attacker
has released them, is an operational characteristic performed of the target. The attacking VM
then tries to read back the same instruction set, checks for missing blocks of memory, and tries to
replicate the possible instruction set [69].
An event channel is just like a signal channel used to inform communication parties about
the occurrence of a new event. The writer tells reader about the data it just wrote. Then, once a
reader finishes reading it, it deletes the data and tell the writer that a new space is ready for
the next input through the event channel. Therefore, the event channel must be well protected,
otherwise it will mess up the whole communication. Delivering the wrong information may cause
the shared memory channel to go out-of-sync [34].
The grant table provides two types of grants between different VMs. One type is page-flipping,
while the other is page-sharing. Per-packet page-flipping has too much performance overhead,
due to the high frequency of hypercalls. Therefore, the new communications have dropped page-
flipping but have preserved a page-sharing grant. The Xen memory sharing mechanism is at
a page granularity level. Shared pages are identified by an integer, which is known as a grant
reference. The hypervisor keeps the grants information, passes the grant reference to the com-
munication VMs and signals it via the event channel. The hypervisor will be the authority for
authenticating communication parties. Under certain circumstances, the system may delegate
communication parties to manage the grant table by themselves, for performance reasons [34, 70].
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Ranjuth [59] has stated that if a VM is migrated to a new host, then the memory used by that
VM will be recovered by the VMM. If a new VM is started on that VMM, there is the possibility
that the memory used by the old VM will be allocated to the new one. This new VM may be an
attacker. Therefore, the attacker can search all the memory pages for some specific information
such as passwords, session keys, and other aspects about the first VM.
When a VM is destroyed or shut down, the information from the virtual machine can then be
leaked. After the destruction or shut down of a virtual machine, its memory can be allocated to a
new virtual machine which runs on the same VMM [59].
2.6.1.5 Row Hammer Attacks
Recent DRAM chips have huge capacity and a high density of memory cells. Therefore, a memory
cell can suffer from disturbance errors due to electrical interference from neighboring cells.
Especially when an adversary quickly and frequently accesses the DRAM with precise patterns,
some data bits in the memory area, where the adversary has no access rights, can be flipped due
to electrical interactions. Such DRAM hardware vulnerability is called a row hammer attack.
Xiao et al. [71] abused this memory loophole in order to attack a para-virtualized platform
from a guest VM. In this attack, an adversary VM kept accessing selected data in the DRAM, in
order to flip critical bits of this VM’s page table entry. By doing so, the page table entry points to
a fake page table, without being observed and checked by the hypervisor. The fake page table
interprets the VM’s virtual page to a physical page that does not have a connection with this VM.
Consequently, the attacker VM can steal or tamper with the sensitive data of the co-located VMs.
2.6.1.6 Code Reuse
Code reuse exploits rely on code fragments (gadgets) located at predetermined memory addresses
[23, 36, 39]. Code diversification and randomization techniques (colloquially known as fine-
grained ASLR [105]) can thwart code-reuse attacks by perturbing executable code at the function
[13, 64], basic block [38, 118], or instruction [57, 87] level, so that the exact location of gadgets
becomes unpredictable [72].
Snow et al. introduced “just-in-time” ROP (JIT- ROP) [105], a technique for bypassing fine-
grained ASLR for applications with embedded scripting support. JIT-ROP is a staged attack:
first, the attacker abuses a memory disclo- sure vulnerability to recursively read and disassemble
code pages, effectively negating the properties of fine-grained ASLR (i.e., the exact code layout
becomes known to the attacker); next, the ROP payload is constructed on-the-fly using gadgets
collected during the first step.
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2.6.1.7 Denial of Service
The Denial of Service attack (DoS) is a serious threat. Both the privileged host and the normal
guest OS are under threat from this type of attack, due to poor authentication with current
communication mechanisms [33, 34, 72]. DoS attacks make other hosts unable to perform actions
in a timely way. Hardware sharing can also be exploited in order to conduct host-based DoS
attacks. The adversary VM can generate contention regarding different types of shared resources,
in order to degrade the victim VM’s performance, or to increase its own performance.
The first affected resource of focus is the CPU. Grunwald and Ghiasi [73] mentioned that it
is possible to flush the shared processor pipeline, but this degrades the victim’s performance.
They achieved this by implementing de-normalized floating point values, thereby creating an
underflow so that the pipeline has to be flushed to handle the exceptional condition. Zhou et al.
[74] exhibited a CPU resource attack, where an attacker VM can abuse the boost mechanism
within the Xen credit scheduler, in order to increase its scheduling priority and to acquire more
CPU resources than are paid for.
The second applied case is the memory system. Varadarajan et al. [75] anticipated the
resource-freeing attack, where an attacker deliberately increases the victim VM’s use of one form
of resource, such as network I/O, to force it to release other types of resources, such as CPU
caches. This allows a co-located VM controlled by the attacker, to use more of the latter resources.
Grunwald and Ghiasi [73] considered the effect of trace cache expulsions on the victim’s execution,
with Hyper-Threading enabled through an Intel Pentium 4 Xeon processor, and indicated that
a malicious thread can slow down a victim’s performance by a factor of 10 to 20. Woo and Lee
[76] discovered that frequently flushing shared L2 caches on multi-core platforms could slow
down a victim’s processing speed. They studied saturation and the locking of buses that connect
L1/L2 caches and main memory [76]. Moscibroda and Mutlu [77] studied contention attacks on
the schedulers of memory controllers.
The third category of DoS is that of I/O resources and networking. I/O resource contention can
also be responsible for degradation of the victim’s performance. For network resources, Bedi et al.
[78] proposed a network-initiated DoS attack where the attacker VM causes contention within
the Network Interface controller, in order to degrade the victim’s working. For disk resources,
Yang et al. [79] proposed a method of reverse-engineering the I/O scheduling within the virtual-
ization platform, assisting the attacker to design specific Denial-of-Service attacks on the disk I/O
resources. Chiang et al. [80] designed a more efficient adaptive attack, classifying the victim’s I/O
usage pattern, and synchronizing the attack phase with the victim. Huang and Lee [81] proposed
cascading performance attacks, in which an attacker VM consumes the I/O processing capabil-
ities of the Xen Dom0, and thereby degrades the victim VM’s performance. Similarly, Alarifi
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and Wolthusen [82] exploited VM migration in order to reduce Dom0’s capability in I/O processing.
The last considered case in DoS is its impact on power. An attacker can reduce the host
server’s power utilization, in order to break down the victim’s cloud services, or even the whole
server. Xu et al. [83] designed an attack, using power over-subscription methods, this damages
the datacenter. The technique creates instances on the host server and executes power-hungry
programs which enhance server’s power capacity to its peak. It therefore affects overall power
consumption by exceeding its levels. As a result, the power unit fails and the server shuts down.
2.7 Cross-VM attack
2.7.1 Co-location Attack
In an IaaS system, VM co-location attack threatens victim VM’s position, for instance its host
server, which can be recognized by the attacker. At that point the attacker launches their VM on
the same host server as the victim VM, whereby they share the same hardware resources I/O
and network devices. Co-location attacks are prerequisite for other shared infrastructure attacks
[72, 84].
Researchers have already presented a number of ways for achieving co-residency. ‘Flooder’
is one approach to achieving co-residency [85]. To begin the search for his target machine, the
attacker creates a large number of instances on the cloud, which are referred to as flooder. Each
flooder publicizes its existence to a master host, the client is an attacker outside the cloud. A
series of signals are then sent to each flooder. According to these signals, the flooder then injects
a network activity into the outbound interface of its physical host machine. Through this, the
client can then test for colocation [85].
Ristenpart et al. [56] first exhibited a network-based methodology for launching colocation at-
tacks in a public cloud, e.g., through Amazon EC2. An attacker can launch many unnecessary VM
instances in the same availability region as the victim VM, and follow different ways to examine if
their VMs are successful in co-locating with the victim VM or not. Some of the attacker’s methods
for examination include, executing the TCP SYN traceroute for detecting the network traffic’s
first hop (which is Dom0 in the host Xen server) of this VM and the victim VM. An identical
Dom0 IP address between his VM and the victim VM will specify the co-location. Additionally,
the attacker can calculate the network packet round-trip time between his VM and the victim
VM. A smaller value indicates that two VMs share the same machine. Then, the attacker can
check the internal IP addresses of his VM and that of his victim VM. Numerically-close internal
IP addresses indicate that two VMs likely reside on the same server [86].
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Watermarking is a simple signature measure used for identification purposes, which can be
useful for post-hoc leakage point identification, as it uniquely marks the origin of ex-filtrated
material [87]. The attacker penetrates the network activities of each of his malicious VMs, while
measuring the victim VM’s network performance. A delay in the network from the victim VM
shows that its performance has been affected by the malicious VM, and hence the co-location
is confirmed. Herzberg et al. [88] proposed a co-location method through two steps. In the first
step, the attacker identifies the victim VM’s internal IP address. The attacker then configures a
client machine to connect to the victim’s web service, for instance by downloading a file or a web
page, via its public IP address. The attacker also uses a prober VM to transmit a large number of
network packets to every possible internal address in the address block range. If the attacker’s
client machine notices that the victim’s performance has been affected by the prober VM, then
the victim VM’s internal address is the one that the prober VM is flooding. Secondly, the attacker
use a Time to Live (TTL) scanner, applying the internal addresses to count the number of hops
between his VM and that of his victim. A zero TTL indicates possible co-residency.
Xu et al. [89] applied the DNS lookup method in finding out the victim VM’s internal IP
address, and consequently confirmed the co-location through two steps. The first step involved pre-
filtering unlikely pairs of co-located VMs, by checking the /24 prefix in the internal IP addresses.
If two VMs do not share the /24 prefix of the internal IP addresses, then they are not likely
to be co-located. The second step is to use the bus locking covert channel to justify co-location,
which involves building a bus locking covert channel between each pair of VMs. If two VMs can
communicate with each other via this covert channel, then they are located on the same physical
machine. Varadarajan et al. [90] also exploited the bus locking covert channels, as a means of
evaluating the financial costs of co-location within different public clouds.
2.7.2 Inter VM-Communication, or Communication Between VMs and Hosts
Isolation is the main feature supported by virtualization. Such a feature, if not configured prop-
erly, can result in a potential threat to cloud infrastructure. Virtualization’s isolation property
ensures that applications executing one VM, do not interfere with the applications of another
VM. It should be carefully observed that isolation means that breaking into one virtual machine
should not allow for access to its co-located virtual machines within the same environment, and
not even to its underlying host machine.
A shared clipboard within a virtual machine is a suitable program that permits data to be
transmitted between VMs and the host. This application can also be considered a gateway for
transmitting data between malicious programs in VMs. In the worst case, it can be used to
"exfiltrate sensitive data to/from the host operating system”.
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In some VM technologies, the VM layer can keep a log of screen updates and keystrokes,
through the virtual terminals that successively grant necessary authorization to the kernel of
host operating systems. These captured logs are stored in the host, making it a possibility for
hosts to observe these logs, even those of encrypted terminal connections inside the VMs.
Some virtualization circumvents isolation. The basic idea behind this logic is to support
applications considered for one operating system, to be executed on another operating system,
without any modification. This solution abuses the security bearers within both of the operating
systems. In such systems, where there is lack of isolation between the host and the VMs, they
provide the virtual machines unlimited access rights for the utilization of underlying host’s
resources of file systems and networks.
The communication between VMs is referred to as guest-to-guest communication, and such
attacks are called guest-to-guest attacks. Here the attackers use one VM to access or control
other VMs, through the same hypervisor. These attacks can happen without compromising the
hypervisor layer. A malicious VM can potentially access other VMs through shared memory,
network connections, and other shared resources [91]. For example, if a malicious VM determines
where the memory of other co-located VMs lie, then it could be written or read in that location,
and then it could interfere with other VM operations.In guest-to-guest attack, an attacking VM
(VM1) can access VM2 and VM3 and so on. The attacker may or may not be authorized to access
other VMs, but in this example, it accesses VMs without authority [37].
2.8 Survey of the state of the art
This section survey the state-of-the-art related work in the area of cross-VM attacks, particularly
cross-VM network channel attacks for data leakage or to escalate the privilege level of non-root
user.
2.8.1 Vulnerabilities in Network channel
Cloud services are accessed through the network using standard protocols e.g., IP which is
considered to be untrustworthy [65]. Internet Protocol (IP) is the method of transferring data
from one machine to another. Each machine is assigned an IP address for communication. There
are several vulnerabilities within Internet Protocols, which are discussed as follows. The use of
same IP addresses by different users may at times lead to accessing different resources of other
users [33], [32]. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a protocol used to map an IP address to a
corresponding physical machine address [92].
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Within cross-VM Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) attacks [93], the attacking VM launches
an ARP spoofing attack by forging an identical IP address within the target VM, and sends
an ARP packet to the virtual router. The virtual router updates the routing table when the
spoofed ARP packet is received. As a result, any traffic directed to a target VM is instead sent
to the attacking VM, which can then decide to either perform sniffing or modification. In bridge
network configuration mode [93], the bridge acts as a virtual hub. All VMs share the virtual hub
to communicate with the network. An attacking VM can sniff the virtual network by using a
sniffing tool, such as Wireshark [94]. In the router network mode [93], a router plays a role of a
virtual switch using a dedicated virtual interface to connect to each VM.
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poisoning [95] is also considered to be a well-known
vulnerability for Internet protocols [96]. By using this vulnerability, malicious VM can redirect
all the inbound and outbound traffic of a co-located VM to the malicious VM, as ARP does not
require Proof-of-Origin [33].
2.8.2 Return Oriented Programming
There are a number of different real-time attacks that exploit ROP systems. On the application
layer, Adobe declared that a critical vulnerability had existed in the Adobe Flash Player 10.0.45.2,
and its earlier versions [97]. These vulnerabilities also occur in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x and
are executed by applying ROP. As a result, this vulnerability bypass data execution prevention
(DEP) [98], which is a security system implemented by Windows, thereby compromising the
full system and making it possible for the attacker to take control of the victimized system
[99], [100]. For the Windows operating system, the ROP-based rootkits have been used at the
kernel layer. Upon execution, these rootkits can manage to hide malicious processes, files and
network connections through windows. These rootkits are developed through ROP techniques,
consequently circumventing kernel integrity protection systems such as SecVisor [101]. The
ROP technique can be used to exploit the Apple iPhone, in which an unauthorized user installs
applications, or leaks a customer’s SMS database [102]. Table 2.2 presents already-existing cloud
attacks.
2.8.3 Analysis
This section has surveyed cross-VM attacks to ascertain the most unknown research to this
thesis. [32, 93, 103]. In these papers, researchers have used different approaches such as ARP
spoofing, sniffing the virtual network and ROP. The purpose of these attacks are to redirect the
network traffic of compromised VM and to describe how an unprivileged VM using ROP technique
can manage to modify the code of hypervisor through which it can escalate its privilege level.
However, all these attack strategies have some limitations as the security perimeter of cloud
computing blocks such attack settings by placing more layer of isolation between VMs or to stop
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executing arbitrary code.
Key lessons learned for the overall approaches are described as- there are number of potential
avenues of research channels which are remain unexplored. Researchers have neither suggested
any indication for the redirection of network traffic by exploiting the network channel through
impersonation and mirroring approach nor show any possibility for the privilege escalation by
applying the conjunction of ROP and exploitation of the network channel. This research work
focuses on the exploitation of network channel for a variety of following reasons: (i) It arguably
has the highest potential to redirect the real time network traffic of a target VM and to escalate
the privilege level of unprivileged VM. (ii) Prior work only redirects the network traffic and
escalate the privilege level using traditional approaches such as ARP spoofing and ’ret’ statement
that can be easily countered in virtualisation. The proposed approaches provides an in-depth
analysis of the techniques involved and their effects, both in qualitative and quantitative terms,
in various settings. (iii) The result of this proposed approach is so effective upon success, it can
redirect the network traffic at hidden point as well as can control toolstack to manage other VMs.
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TCP/IP Header Steganography [62]
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Figure 2.6: Anatomy of Cross-VM Attacks
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2.9 Countermeasures
2.9.1 Reducing Side/Covert Channel Leakage
There are several methods cloud providers can use to defend against side-channel cache attacks.
The first method to inhibit cache sharing divides it into different regions for different VMs or
applications. This is achievable through the use of software or hardware approaches. As for
software, some researchers have misused the page coloring approach for cache partitioning [104],
[105]. Kim et al. [106] designed the application ‘STEALTHMEM’, used it to partition the Last
Level Cache (LLC). It offers each VM a number of covert pages, which cannot be changed in the
cache. Liu et al. [107] abused the Intel Cache Allocation Technology to prevent the victim VM’s
sensitive data from being exchanged, by the attacking VM in the LLC. New hardware caches have
been introduced to partition the caches by ways or sets in order to protect against side-channel
attacks due to cache exclusions [108].
The second approach practices randomization in system design, so that attackers do not obtain
any useful information. For software, system clock measurements are blurred in order to interrupt
the attackers’ monitoring [109], [110]. Zhang et al. [111] launched Duppel, which periodically
executes cache purging during VM’s executions, and adds noise to attacker’s observations. For
hardware, new caches have been designed to randomize memory-to-cache mappings, and cache
fetching [112], [108], [113], [114].
2.9.2 Optimizing Resources
To alleviate DoS attacks caused by resource contention, the cloud provider can optimize resource
usage between different domains and reduce performance interference. For memory contention,
the approach divides memory resources between different domains, such as Intel Cache Allocation
Technology [115]. For I/O contention, the cloud server can observe and manage the bandwidth
of I/O traffic, in order to avoid resource exhaustion. It can also use Direct Device Assignment
to physically eliminate I/O intrusion between each VM [116]. These solutions have been widely
adopted by public cloud providers. For the power resource, Li et al. [117] proposed PAD as a safe
data center for power attacks under the over-subscription setting. PAD creates a virtual battery
pool, which activates load sharing and adjusts power utilization for each rack. It can sense and
shear power spikes, in order to avoid power consumption failure.
2.9.3 Protection of VM images
It is important to safe VM images in the cloud application store and eliminate potential vulnera-
bilities of their publishers and the retrievers. Wei et al. [118] introduced an image management
system, Mirage to deal with the security issues of VM images by different methods: (1) Access
control: Mirage follows access permission of two types, check-out and check-in, to closely observe
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who is retrieving the images. (2) Image filters: Mirage uses special filters to delete sensitive
information from the original images.
2.9.4 Network Defenses
Georgiev and Shmatikov [119] introduced ’CAPTCHAs’ in the protocols to separate human users
from malicious automated scanners.
2.9.5 Eliminating the Hypervisor’s Vulnerabilities
Prior work has considered different methodologies for improving the security of hypervisors. The
first approach develops new secure hypervisors. McCune et al. [120] presented TrustVisor, a tiny
version of the hypervisor used to ensure the reliability of applications’ sensitive data and codes.
In this, a new secure guest mode has been introduced for running applications executed on x86
hardware architecture, supporting virtualization in order to impose strong memory isolation
between the hypervisor, the host OS, and VM applications. TrustVisor also launched a software
micro-TPM instance for each application, in order to perform integrity attestation. Vasudevan et
al. [121] developed, configured and certified an open-source eXtensible and Modular Hypervisor
Framework (XMHF). XMHF consists of a number of different XMHF main and small associate
libraries. A hypervisor application can extend the XMHF core and the basic functionalities
provided by this framework in order to execute preferred security features.
The second approach in this direction is to secure the integrity of hypervisors. Wang et al.
[122] introduced HyperSafe, a lightweight method for ensuring the integrity of Type-I hypervisors
at runtime. HyperSafe applies the Write Protect (WP) bit to prevent hypervisor pages from being
compromised by malicious applications. HyperSafe can also configure a target table consisting of
all legitimate destinations for indirect control flow instructions, as a means of implementing the
hypervisor program’s control flow at runtime. Azab et al. [123] designed HyperSentry as a tool
for calculating the integrity of hypervisor at runtime. A remote client who needs to validate the
hypervisor can use the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) to initiate the server
into the System Management Mode (SMM), and to measure the hypervisor’s code, data and CPU
state. Another direction is to reduce the hypervisors’ privileges and functionalities.
NoHype [124], [125] is designed to eradicate the hypervisor during the VM’s runtime, thereby
reducing the attack surface from the hypervisor. NoHype attains this by pre-allocating processor,
cores and memory for each VM during VM creation, allocating virtualized I/O devices directly to
VMs, in order to circumvent the need for a hypervisor to do I/O emulation. It also modifies the
guest OS to cache host system configuration for later use. Butt et al. [126] proposed self-service
cloud computing as a means of confining the host VM’s privileges. It splits the administrative
privileges between a system-wide VM, and per-client administrative VMs. The per-client ad-
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ministrative VMs are able to implement some privileged system tasks at their own VMs, while
the system-wide VM cannot examine the code, data or computation of client VMs. In this case,
security and privacy are conserved even if the host VM is compromised.
2.9.6 Avoiding Co-location
The main feature of virtualization is shared infrastructure which can be exploited. One way
to eliminate the vulnerability of shared infrastructure, is to reduce or avoid the potential of
co-residency between multiple VMs. This can be achieved through the launching of static VM or
dynamic VM migration. During the launching of VMs, some cloud providers facilitate a choice of
dedicated VMs, where the customers’ VM can completely use a dedicated server without sharing
with other VMs. Moreover, new VM placement policies have been redesigned, thus reducing the
possibility of the co-residency of attacker and victim VMs [127, 128]. Some researchers have
proposed frequently migrating VMs, so as to add greater difficulty for attacking VMs to co-locate
with the target VMs [129–131].
2.9.7 Defeating Row Hammer Attacks
Cross-VM row hammer attacks can be defended against through the use of hardware or software
solutions. For hardware, Error-Correcting Code (ECC) memory can be used to ensure the correct-
ness of one single-bit error, and to detect 2-bit errors. This makes row hammer attacks much
harder [132]. For software, Brasser et al. [133] has suggested two solutions. The first solution is
to extend the system bootloader to recognize exploited memory pages. Row hammer exploitation
tools are executed offline, determining which memory pages could be tempered by row hammer
attacks [134? ]. Then the boot loader indicates that these exploitable memory pages are inaccessi-
ble at boot-time, so that these pages will not be executed at runtime. The second solution is to
extend the OS kernel, in order to impose strong isolation onto the physical memory of different
system entities, such as user and kernel spaces. This ensures that memory between different
entities is physically separated by at least one row, meaning that one entity cannot interfere with
the memory of another. Irazoqui et al. [135] designed MASCAT, a static code analysis tool which
can scan the application of binaries, and detect possible micro-architectural attacks, such as row
hammer attacks. This tool applies the signature-based detection algorithm for searching binary
files with implicit characteristics that micro-architectural attacks usually demonstrate in their
design. In row hammer attacks, the attacker needs to continuously circumvent the cache, and
access a fixed DRAM location. This is used as the signature of row hammer attacks.
The overview of all these attacks and their related countermeasures have been tabulated in
Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Attack and their Related Countermeasures
Attack Countermeasures Ref.
Co-location Dedicated VMs [127]
Runtime VM migration [130, 131]
VM launch placement [128]
Virtualization Designing secure hypervisors [120]
NoHype [124]
Protecting hypervisor integrity [123]
Side/Covert Channel Sharing memory by dividing it into different regions [104–106]
Images Managing VM images [118]
Memory Scheduling adjustment to limit interruptions in memory [136]
DoS Optimizing Resources [115, 116]
Network Channel Client ID verification [137]
Assigning user rights [137]
CAPTCHA [119]
Row Hammer Attacks Error Correction Codes [132]
Memory Isolation [133]
Signature-based detection algorithm [135]
Return-Oriented
Programming (ROP) Defeating ROP Attacks [138]
2.9.8 Analysis
This section has surveyed the countermeasures of cross-VM attacks. Some of the countermeasures
[126,137,138] are closely related to this thesis. In these studies, researchers have proposed
different countermeasures such as dedicated VMs, assigning user rights and defeating ROP
attacks. The purpose of these countermeasures are to block cross-VM, network channel and ROP
attacks. However, all these countermeasures have some limitations as dedicated VMs on cloud
computing are not appropriate for cloud providers because they save their operational cost by
sharing the same hardware among multiple VMs. Similarly, assigning user rights to VMs and
defeating ROP attacks can be circumvent by attacking VMs through privilege escalation. The
lesson learned from the overall approaches is: researchers have proposed several countermeasures,
but there is very limited research in proposing the countermeasures of heterogeneous attack
strategies.
2.10 Discussion and Findings
This chapter has discussed the previous works which focus on cross-VM attacks and their
countermeasure solutions within a cloud computing environment. Figure 2.6 summarizes these
works according to the different types of attacks , which an attacker leveraged. It has been
demonstrated in Figure 2.6 that researchers conducted substantial work to not only in exploiting
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the shared hardware such as images, memory, virtualization but also in exploitation of hypervisor
through ROP and change in memory codes to escalate the privilege rights. From the literature
review and the current state-of-the-art, it is observable that there is a clear gap in exploitation of
network channel and ROP through combination of different approaches to redirect the network
traffic of co-located VMs and to escalate the privilege level of non-root VMs. On the one hand, the
analyses are completely focused on how the attacking VMs are maximum utilizing or exploiting
the shared resources to degrade or exploit the hardware performance and completely neglect
the impact of those security failures. On the other hand, theoretical approaches emphasize the
importance of reducing these failures without providing any insight about the characteristics and
dimensions of the addressed problem. As a result, this creates the requirement for comprehensive
security failure analyses in real cloud environments.
2.11 Summary
This chapter has provided a comprehensive literature review of state-of-the-art concepts of cloud
computing, their essential characteristics, cloud computing models, security features, attack
vectors and countermeasures. It has also been presented how they can be used to better study
and quantify systems security in cloud model.
The abstraction of the cloud system model has been presented, and the concepts of a cloud
system being composed of multiple nodes which interact with each other through different in-
terfaces within the system environment have been introduced. Furthermore, the concept about
virtualization has been discussed in detail and also its system support in terms of hardware and
software. Cloud computing and their service models are also discussed in detail.
The concept and definition of Cloud computing, as well as the key terminology and character-
istics have been presented. Furthermore, the components of Cloud computing security including
CIA, different services, as well as virtualization, and servers have been discussed in detail.
The concept of potential attack vectors in cloud model has been presented, and the critical
need for empirical analysis and modeling of Cloud systems security discussed. A literature review
of the current state-of-the-art of analyzing and characterizing Cloud attacks, including co-location
attacks, side-channel attacks and network-channel attacks, has been presented and discussed in
detail. Finally, current gaps in the state-of-the-art for these attacks as well as opportunities where
security of cloud system model can be enhanced has been highlighted. The countermeasures
solution have been presented of already existed attacks which includes optimizing resources,
network defenses , reducing side-channel attacks and defense mechanism of row hammer attacks.
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From the analysis, we further conclude that all of the above work suggests a strong need
for further exploration of cross-VM attacks and associated channels. In contrast to these points,
there is a need for research to consider a ROP perspective on cross-vm attacks. Hence further
research is required to apply ROP and impersonating attacks allowing new scientific insights to
be gained through examining results in novel ways.
The next chapter further examines the general network and hypervisor architecture of cloud
model, what are their main components. How network traffic passes through VM to access the
external network and how hypervisor creates a domain isolation between co-located VMs to










NETWORK AND HYPERVISOR ARCHITECTURE IN CLOUD
COMPUTING
This chapter provides a qualitative study of network and hypervisor architecture andshares insights gained from their operations. More specifically, the main goal of thechapter is to examine the unique characteristics and main components of network and
hypervisor architecture in the context of network traffic flow and domain isolation properties
through in-depth observations.
The overarching purpose of this chapter is to provide deeper understanding of the cloud
network system and hypervisor in terms of their main components, how they connect with each
other, network traffic flow, hypervisor domains, privilege levels of root, non-root VMs and their
domain isolation properties.
3.1 Cloud System Model
This section describes the core components, hypervisors used, network and their isolation proper-
ties, firewall rules, IP addressing schemes and their implementation in the network architecture
of cloud model.
3.1.1 Nodes of Cloud Model
Following are the main nodes of cloud model.
Node Types: A node is a hardware machine that operates with the support of an operating
system and well defined software are configured on it. At a high level of abstraction, following
are node specifications and their descriptions [139].
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Controller: These types of the nodes are responsible for executing the services of management
software that are needed for the cloud platform to run [139].
Compute: Compute nodes execute the virtual machine instances. KVM is used as a hypervisor
in this node. This node is also responsible for providing the firewall services. One can run more
than one compute node in a setup [139].
Network: The responsibilities of such nodes are to ensure creation of virtual networks needed
for the customer to create public or private networks and connects their virtual machines with
the external networks, i.e. the Internet [139].
3.1.2 Modes of Cloud Configuration
The cloud model can be configured in three different modes as described below.
Single Node Setup
Cloud model offers a variety of different configuration set-ups that support different back ends
and network configuration options. In a single node setup, only one server runs all services and





Figure 3.1: Single Node Setup
Multi-Node Setup (2-Node)
Two node architecture separates the control and compute nodes. Each node has its own function-
ality and features. Multiple services are run on these nodes separately [140]. Double-Node setup
has been shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Double Node Setup
Multi-Node Setup (3-Node)
Cloud model meets different needs by enabling several options such as compute, networking,
and storage, thus it proves highly flexible. In three-node architecture, a controller and a network
node can also be added as additional nodes in a more complex multiple node configuration [140].
Figure 3.3 shows the three-node setup.
3.1.3 Network Services in Cloud Model
The networking services offered by cloud model is a standalone service that configures multiple
processes across a number of nodes. These processes communicate with each other and other
services. The leading process of the networking services is a neutron-server, a module written in
Python that imports the Networking API and is responsible for forwarding the tenant requests
to different plug-ins for further processing. The main Networking components [141] are:
Neutron Server (neutron-server and neutron-*-plugin)
This service configures and executes on the network node to service the Networking API and
its extensions. It is also responsible for implementing the network model and assigning the IP
addressing to each port. The neutron-server provides indirect access to a persistent database. This
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Internet
Controller




Figure 3.3: Triple Node Setup
It runs on each compute node and is responsible for managing the local virtual switch (vswitch)
[143] configuration. This service involves message queue access and depends on the plugin used.
Some special plugins like OpenDaylight(ODL) [144] and Open Virtual Network (OVN) [145] do
not require any python agents on compute nodes.
DHCP Agent (neutron-dhcp-agent)
Offers DHCP services to tenant networks. This agent is responsible for managing DHCP configu-
ration [146]. The neutron-dhcp-agent involves message queue access.
L3 Agent (neutron-l3-agent)
Includes L3/NAT forwarding that is used for external network access of VMs. it requires message
queue access for message forwarding [146].
Network Provider Services (Software Defined Networking (SDN) server/services)
It offers additional networking services to user networks. These SDN [147] services may commu-
nicate with neutron-server, neutron-plugin, and plugin-agents through network channels such as
REST APIs. Figure 3.4 depicts an architectural and networking flow diagram of the OpenStack
Networking components:
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Figure 3.4: Cloud Model Networking Components
Placement of Cloud Networking Services on Physical Servers
A typical cloud architecture consists of a controller (host machine), a network machine and a set
of compute machines for launching and executing multiple VMs. A distinct physical data center
networks is required to setup a regular networking setup. These includes:
Management Network
Cloud components can be internally communicating by using this network. The IP address
assigned on this network communicate within the local data center. Their IP addresses are not
accessible from external network i.e the Internet [148].
Guest Network
This network is responsible for VM data communication within cloud platform. The IP require-
ments of such a network is based upon the plug-ins used and the network configured [148].
External network
This network facilitates VMs to access external world i.e. Internet. The IP addresses assigned in
this network must be accessible everywhere on the Internet [148].
API network
API network is a special network that includes all APIs, including network APIs. The IP ad-
dresses assigned in this network should be accessible on the Internet. This acts as an external
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network. In this network, it is also possible to construct a subnet for the external network [148].
The Cloud Networking Services and their connectivity with Management, Guest, External























Figure 3.5: Cloud Model Networking Services
Networking Services: In the preliminary architectural phases of Network infrastructure, it
is necessary to ensure that proper technical skill is offered to contribute to the configuration of the
physical networking infrastructure, classify suitable security controls and assessing strategies.
Virtualized network services are added as a layer in the networking which facilitates tenants to
design their own virtual networks. Currently, the traditional networking counterpart services
are more mature and secure as compared to these virtualized services.
Isolation using different methods: Cloud Networking can offer two different mechanisms
for network traffic separation, VLANs (which follows the standard of IEEE 802.1Q tagging) or L2
tunnels using GRE encapsulation.
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Isolation using VLANs and L2-tunneling: The choice and opportunity of network config-
uration determines which technique is applied for network traffic separation or isolation.
VLANs: Virtual LANs [149] keeps the isolation on a particular physical network comprising
IEEE 802.1Q headers having fixed field value of VLAN ID (VID). Traffic in VLAN networks
sharing the same physical networks is separated or isolated from each other. Each separate
physical network offering VLAN networks is considered as a distinct VLAN trunk, with a unique
VID values. VID values are valid from 1 to 4094. The complexity in configuring the VLAN network
depends upon OpenStack network requirements. In order to grant OpenStack Networking to
expeditiously use VLANs, valid VLAN range must be allocated and each compute node physical
switch port is allocated to a VLAN trunk port.
L2 tunneling: Network tunneling encapsulates network combination with a unique “tunnel-
id” that is used to recognize the network traffic linked to that network combination [150]. L2
network connectivity is not dependent upon the physical zone or underlying network configura-
tion. By encapsulating network traffic inside IP packets, that traffic can pass Layer-3 boundaries,
bypassing the preconfigured VLANs and VLAN trunking. Tunneling includes a layer of obfus-
cation to network data traffic, decreasing the reflectiveness of individual tenant traffic from a
monitoring point of view. Both advance networking features i.e. GRE and VXLAN encapsulation
are supported by OpenStack networking. The selection of methodology to configure L2 isolation is
dependent upon the range and size of networks. If the network infrastructure has the availability
of limited VLAN ID or will have a large number of L2 networks, tunneling is recommended in
that case.
Additional Network Services: Network isolation describe how the network security and
security perimeter is implemented. The following network services are optionally available to
improve the security feature of network architecture.
Access Control Lists: Compute node supports VM network traffic access controls [151]
directly when configured with traditional nova-network services, Traditional security groups
in nova-network are configured to all interface (virtual) ports on VM using iptable. Security
perimeter permits administrators and VMs to identify the network traffic type, and directions
(traffic moving towards inward/outward) endorsed to move through a virtual interface port. When
applying the networking services, it is recommended to enable security groups in this service
model.
L3 Routing and NAT: Cloud networking implements routers that have the capability to
connect multiple networks, and can also offer a gateway that further connects multiple private
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networks to a shared external network, i.e., the Internet. The L3 routers [149] in an networking
support Network Address Translation (NAT) [152] capabilities on ports (gateway) that connects
the router to external network. This router supports floating IPs and SNATs (Static NAT) for all
traffic by default, that links a static one-to-one mapping from a public IP on the external network
to a private IP.
Firewalls (FWaaS): There is the need to manage and apply the ironic set of security features.
Such features are provided by FWaaS which are normally broader and dense than security
features offered by security groups [153].
3.1.4 Networking Services Limitations
Following are the well-known limitations in cloud networking services.
IP addresses Overlapping: If multiple namespaces are not supported by physical(host)
machine, then networking service like DHCP and L3 agents must be run on different hosts. The
main reason behind this concept is that there is no isolation between IP addresses created by
L3 agent and the DHCP agent. If support of network namespace is not available then the other
limitation of the L3 agent is that it only supports a single router.
Limitation of Neutron agents: Many plug-ins used neutron-l3-agent to implement forward-
ing, but neutron agents do not support IPv6 forwarding. [154]. The main limitation of neutron
agents in case of IPv6 forwarding is OpenStack Networking does not support any services to
facilitate any flavor of NAT with IPv6.
All these networking services and plug-ins are used in designing the network. As a case study,
the network architecture of cloud computing has been designed where these services and plug-ins
are widely used.
3.2 Cloud Network Architecture
Cloud provider provides highly rich security groups and policies that can be applied on a wide
range of parameters on ingress and egress traffic of users, VMs, containers and applications.
Security groups can be defined and applied dynamically per VM to ensure maximum protection.
The flexibility and control of security groups allow enterprises to act accordingly and respond to
threats quickly. Each VM has an IP address assigned to associated Vif. This IP address is only
visible to the virtual switch, where all VMs are connected to br-int, i.e. part of open virtual switch
(OVS) through TAP device which created automatically upon connection request. TAP is an access
path where network traffic passes from VM to VSwitch. br-int and br-ex are OpenVSwitches
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which are responsible for managing ingress and egress requests respectively as shown in Figure
3.6. Open-VSwitch is a virtualized switch and is part of hypervisor. It performs the functionality
of Layer-2 switch and offers different features such as Access Control List, VLAN and many more.
It offers subnet or private network to VMs [155].
Virtual switch is similar to virtual network interface which is organized by combining one or
more virtual Ethernet interfaces. Virtual switch is further connected to a virtual router through
Veth pair. Veth pair is responsible for making a connection between VSwitch and vrouter. The
vrouter is used for maintaining routing table for ingress and egress traffic flow. Routers are
implemented with the strict configuration of firewall (FWaaS) that implements security perimeter.
The router further transmits the packet to its next hop, i.e. on the external bridge br-ex. The
external bridge contains a physical network interface, eth0 which finally pass the network packet












Figure 3.6: General Cloud Architecture
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3.2.1 Vulnerability Found in Cloud Network Architecture
As discussed in Section 1.4, individual network components and their functionality to determine
the vulnerability in a top down approach [156] have been investigated. An outbound packet starts
on virtual interface (Vif ) of the VM, which is connected to a TAP device. The TAP device is a part
of the network and is attached to a bridge device. The bridge (br-int) is the central part where all
VM’s are connected through TAP respectively. The br-int performs VLAN tagging and un-tagging
of traffic coming from and to VM. Each network is assigned a different VLAN ID to ensure the
network traffic segregation between different VMs co-resided on the same hardware. Security
configuration cannot allow VM to directly access the network bridge. It allows VM to connect
through TAP device as shown in Figure 3.6. Hence, the only possible way to attack or penetrate in
the network is by compromising the TAP. So we investigate the TAP, their attributes, connection
with VM and br-int simultaneously and identify the vulnerability in TAP is as below.
The cloud network system allows connection of a VM’s TAP interface with vswitch that does
not have a private Ethernet Interface at the backend for internal communication between VMs
or to access the Internet.
After discovering this vulnerability, network architectures of different cloud models and
cross-cutting vulnerabilities found in OpenStack and Oracle Ravello network systems that share
the same network architecture have been explored.
3.2.2 OpenStack and Oracle Ravello Networking
OpenStack and Oracle Ravello provides security groups and policies that can be applied to
parameters on incoming and outgoing user traffic, VMs, and containers. Security groups, such as
firewall rules, SSH control, and port bounding can be defined and applied dynamically to improve
protection. The flexibility of security groups allows enterprises to quickly respond to threats. The
network architecture of OpenStack ( as shown in Figure 3.7) is implemented through four virtual
networking devices:
• The Test Access Point (TAP) is an external monitoring device between the physical Ethernet
card and each VM within the physical machine.
• The Veth Pair is a virtual network cable connecting the Linux bridge to a virtual bridge
residing in a physical machine.
• The Open Virtual Switch (OVS) is the virtual bridge responsible for managing incoming
and outgoing traffic. It functions as a Layer-2 network switch providing different features
of Access Control List and Virtual LAN (VLAN), as well as providing subnet or private
network functionality to VMs. Each VM has an IP address visible to the virtual switch and
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is connected to a OVS bridge interface. The OVS contains two sub-components: (1) br-int
is responsible for VLAN tagging (assigning the ID network traffic of VMs) and is used by
cloud providers to implement isolation between VMs, and (2) br-ext, used to bridge the
virtual bridge to the physical network device.
• The Linux bridge (L.B) is responsible for communication between the br-int and each VM’s
TAP, recording it through a MAC caching table that saves the address and port number of
packets between the VM and the Ethernet card. This is used to prevent packets of unknown
IPs flooding to all VMs.
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int-br-eth1
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Figure 3.7: Networking Devices Used for Traffic Transmission
A VM creates and stores data on the associated VNIC, such as eth0. The data is then
transmitted to the TAP on the compute host. Normally, a TAP offers an access path to data
passing through a network. The TAPs are further linked to the Linux bridges that pass the data
to Veth Pair which acts as one side of the cable. Data sent to one side of Veth Pair can be received
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at the other end. The other end of the pair is on the integration bridge: br-int. This bridge is
responsible for the attachment of all the VM’s TAPs and any other bridge on the system. The
integration bridge further connects with br-eth as shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Function of br-int and br-eth
Proof of Concept As a proof of concept, we exploit the same vulnerability for Google and
Microsoft Azure but didn’t find it feasible. Since the success for exploitation of the vulnerability
depends upon the factor of illegal TAP connection with the bridge, which is not granted in these
cloud models, because of their different internal configurations of network devices. These cloud
models before granting the connection of VM’s TAP interface with vswitch ensure the connection
of VM’s private Ethernet Interface with TAP. They will grant the connection only if TAP is
connected with the Ethernet.
3.3 Hypervisor Architecture
The domain architecture of xen hypervisor is explained in below section.
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3.3.1 XEN
Xen is a concrete hypervisor that uses a microkernel strategy, furnish functions that let multiple
computers (VMs) to parallel run on the same computer hardware . It provides the strong isolation
between virtual machines co-resided on same physical machine. It is open source (GPLv2) and
is operated by Xen.org, a cross-industry organization. Xen comprises of different products and









Figure 3.9: Xen Hypervisor Architecture.
Xen Project executes in a more privileged CPU state than any other software on the machine.
It main responsibility entails memory management, CPU scheduling of VMs and launching of
most privileged domain (dom0). Dom0 is the privileged domain and only virtual machine has
direct access to hardware. It has full rights to control all the unprivileged domains (domUs).
3.3.2 Privileged and Unprivileged domains
A number of virtual machines VMs or domains can run on Xen. When the system boots, bootloader
firstly loads the Xen, then Xen loads its main domain dom0. As Xen does not manage any device
drivers, dom0 is used to access the hardware and can handle device requests. It is also the
only administrative domain that is responsible for creating, pausing, unpausing, saving, and
destroying other VMs residing on the same physical hardware. Contrary to this, other domains
that dom0 launch have no such admin privileges and are called domU, unprivileged domain. Data
that manages the domain privilege is a Boolean value store in a domain structure of hypervisor
code. It is set to be 1 for dom0 and 0 in case of domUs. If the escalation of the privilege of domU
is required, it is needed to modify the allocated value for this domU from zero to one [103].
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3.3.3 Xen Vulnerabilities
If a non-root user desires to expand its resources in case of cloud expansion, it becomes a root
user of its own domain and can further sublet its resources. The expansion of cloud model can be
possible through return-oriented programming (RoP) but this RoP in turn is vulnerable to attack.
As discussed in section 1.4, we implemented different approaches iteratively to find vulnerability
in RoP of cloud system but failed to do so, because of strict cloud security configuration.
Hence, we conclude that exploitation of ROP alone is not vulnerable because of strict security
configurations of modern cloud models. Therefore, we combine exploitation of ROP in conjunction
with network channel and find it vulnerable through which the attacker can make an illegal
network connection with the root user. Consequently, upon the successful (illegal) connection, the
attacker can escalate the privilege level of its VM by breaking the domain isolation of hypervisors
and control ToolStack from where it can manage other VMs. We investigate the feasibility of this
vulnerability in the OpenStack architecture with Xen running underneath as shown in Figure
3.10.
Figure 3.10: OpenStack Xen Architecture
A brief description of OpenStack with Xen architecture and its domains i.e Domain 0 (dom0)
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and Domain U (domU) are discussed as follows:
3.3.3.1 Domain U
In virtualized environments, each guest VM run their own operating system and applications. The
hypervisor supports two different virtualization modes: Para virtualization (PV) and Hardware-
assisted or Full Virtualization (HVM) discussed in section 2.1.2. Both guest types can be used
at the same time on a single hypervisor. It is also possible to use techniques used for Para
virtualization in an HVM guest: essentially creating a continuum between PV and HVM. This
approach is called PV on HVM. Guest VMs are totally isolated from the hardware: in other words,
they have no privilege to access hardware or I/O functionality directly. Thus, they are also called
unprivileged domain (or DomU).
3.3.3.2 The Control Domain (or Domain 0)
Domain 0 is a specialized Virtual Machine that has special admin privileges like the capability to
access the hardware directly, handles all access to the system’s I/O functions and interacts with
the other Virtual Machines. It also manages a control interface to the outside world, through
which the system is controlled. Domain 0, the first VM started by the system.
3.3.3.3 Toolstack and Console
Domain 0 consists of a special management tool called control stack (also called Toolstack) that
lets a user to manage virtual machine creation, destruction, and configuration.
3.3.3.4 OpenStack Nova
It runs the XenAPI library code of domU to communicate with xapi of dom0. Both codes are
written in python. It follows the communication path of Host Internal Management Network
to reach from the domU to dom0 without leaving the host. Xapi to xapi library code is used for
communication between dom0 to dom0. This normally is used in case of cloud expansion.
3.3.3.5 XAPI
XAPI is the fundamental component of Toolstack that manage a Xen based hypervisor. The job of
XAPI’s is analogous to libvirt’s in the KVM world. XenAPI provided API of XAPI. Compute driver
in OpenStack communicate to xapi, hence all xapi servers could be used with OpenStack [157].
3.3.3.6 XenAPI
XAPI provided API of XenAPI. Xenapi is also included in python library which is xapi client
[157].
57
CHAPTER 3. NETWORK AND HYPERVISOR ARCHITECTURE IN CLOUD COMPUTING
3.3.3.7 XenServer
XenServer is an open source virtualization platform that facilitates all features needed for any
server and datacenter implementation entails Xen hypervisor and XAPI for management [157].
3.4 Analysis
From the analysis of architectures discussed in this chapter, several findings have been identified.
First, it has been observed after investigating the network architecture and traffic flow in
cloud computing that there is a serious threat to cloud computing if we did not block the penetra-
tion of any external device into the network. The vulnerability found in leading cloud computing
is the illegal connection of TAP device with internal network vswitch. Through this connection,
the attacker can penetrate itself in the network system of cloud computing. We have surveyed
different cloud models to discover this vulnerability and found OpenStack and Oracle Ravello are
vulnerable to this attack. As a proof of concept, we have tested the same vulnerability in Google
and Microsoft Azure but didn’t find it executable.
Secondly, some vulnerabilities have also been discovered in Xen hypervisor architecture in
case of cloud expansion. ROP can be used to expand the cloud model. But the attacker can exploit
ROP in conjunction with the network channel to take control of the root domain from where the
attacker can manage other co-located VMs.
The work in this thesis focuses in particular on the OpenStack and Oracle Ravello cloud
system to explore the network architecture. OpenStack and Ravello provide compelling solutions
today for the challenges of delivering flexible infrastructure for high-performance computing
(HPC) and high-throughput computing (HTC), furthermore, the development community is
rapidly expanding services to meet exponential future demands.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed the system model of leading cloud platform OpenStack and Oracle
Ravello System. The fundamental components of these cloud models are also presented in this
chapter. Multiple configurations of Openstack have been presented in detail which shows the
connectivity of nodes with different setups. Network channel along with the services running
on networks were also discussed in detail. These networking services enforces VMs to observe
isolation in shared hardware. Networking services like VLAN, Access Control List, firewall rules
and network traffic routing were responsible to implement security feature in cloud.
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This chapter comprises of two major phases: Analysis, and Learning. These phases run in an
incremental and iterative manner to select cloud architecture. The analysis phase is comprised
of discussion about different cloud deployment setups discussed in detail in this chapter. The
selection of cloud deployment models is then used by the learning phase to build a model for the
prediction of system performance.
Default cloud network architecture has also been explained in this chapter which usually
followed by cloud providers at higher level. However, internal system level configurations are
different of each providers. Network architecture of OpenStack and Oracle Ravello cloud system
has also been discussed in detail which shows the main devices of networks and how network
traffic of multiple co-located VMs passed through these devices.
Hypervisor is responsible to maintain isolation between multiple VMs. Hence, the study of
hypervisor is also important for readers what are the main domains of hypervisors and how
hypervisor keep isolation between root and non-root VMs. What are their limitations. The config-
uration of Xen hypervisor with OpenStack has also been depicted which shows the relationship
between different APIs that makes a connection with root and non-root VMs.
Chapter 4 elaborates how cloud network architectures are configured with security perimeter,
what are the steps to find the vulnerability in cloud network architecture, cloud models that











A CROSS-VIRTUAL MACHINE NETWORK CHANNEL ATTACK VIA
MIRRORING AND TAP IMPERSONATION AND THEIR
COUNTERMEASURE
As discussed in chapter 3, network designing is a fundamental component of cloud comput-ing co-located VMs network traffic passes through different configured devices of networkarchitecture. Data security and privacy is a primary concern for enterprises when they
consider adoption of cloud computing. The purpose of this study is to investigate the implications
of virtualisation on network security vulnerabilities in cloud computing. Physical co-residency
with other co-located virtual machines in a shared hardware environment leads to the possibility
of side channel attacks. Such issues have been highlighted by various researchers, i.e how such
side channel attacks in a shared hardware support attackers to ex-filtrate sensitive data across
co-resident VMs. These side channels act as a security gateway between users and an attacker.
If an attacker manages to exploit these side channels, they can monitor the data of other VMs.
As a result, cloud providers attempt to resolve such issues by ensuring the logical isolation of
resources through an internal virtual network between multiple VMs. Virtual networks play a
vital role in ensuring that one VM cannot interfere with other VMs running on the same host.
Currently, there is a substantial lack of empirical studies comprehensively determining
network attacks and their countermeasures solutions. Current work focuses entirely on IP, ARP
sniffing and spoofing that can compromise the co-located VM network traffic by redirecting it to
some destination point but such attack schemes have been controlled through countermeasures.
Current works neglect the exploitation of network architecture through some internal regular
device responsible for data transmission and connection. Additionally, existing approaches do
not comprehensively study the exploitation of network isolation in cloud computing and do not
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provide a detailed method of network traffic analysis capable of quantifying and extracting
empirical findings. This can be of practical use to researchers and cloud providers. This chapter
presents the study and analysis of attack design by exploiting the network architecture of cloud
computing and following are the major contributions: The key contribution of this research indi-
cates that this internal virtual network, in turn, exposes further vulnerabilities in virtualization
by mounting cross-VM attacks on a network channel. The launching of a novel network channel
attack in which a malicious VM can redirect the network traffic of a victim VM running on
a same physical hardware is presented in this chapter. Launching of such an attack entails
overcoming the challenges of traffic redirection, pre-empting the victim VM traffic, entering into
the current network infrastructure, launching an impersonation attack on interface and removing
the footprints. This research addresses these challenges and demonstrates the proposed attack
on two IaaS cloud platforms: OpenStack, an open source IaaS management system, and Oracle
Ravello Systems, a public IaaS provider, with multiple setups that are configured with security
requirements. In conjunction with our findings, countermeasure solution to the described attack
has also been proposed.
4.1 Introduction
A cloud, a virtualization platform, is an Internet-based computing model [158] that comes in a
variety of forms like grid, distributed, virtualization, utility and parallel. A user can conveniently
use cloud utility services and request access to its resources such as storage, network, computing
and applications on demand. It introduces the concept of ’pay as you go’ [159]. One does not
need to buy its own resources. Instead, one can just pay, use the resources and can enhance or
reduce them on demand. It has some important features such as resource pooling, on-demand
self-service, broad network access, measured service, and rapid elasticity. There are various
service models, which are enabled by the cloud: Software as a Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS) [19] as discussed in chapter 2
The infrastructure of cloud computing depends upon the hypervisor that controls the vir-
tualization environment and network layers which are at the top of the operating system [19].
Generally, a hypervisor has a narrow interface. Hypervisors are of two types Type-I and Type-II.
Type-I hypervisor (native or bare metal) has a few lines of code on the host OS. Xen is an example
of Type-I hypervisor. Type-II hypervisor (hosted) runs within a conventional OS environment.
VMware and Virtual Box are the examples of Type-II hypervisor [160].
Contemporary virtualization technologies such as HyperV [161], Xen [60], and VMWare
[162] are rapidly becoming the foundation for the security of cloud computing systems. Multiple
VMs can co-reside on the same physical hardware due to virtualization of the cloud. The key
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features of their attractiveness is a strong isolation between co-resided VMs, i.e. the guest VM
running on the same system cannot interfere with other guest VMs [10]. Each VM has its lim-
itations and boundaries. The key feature of strong isolation strengthens the security of public
cloud computing systems such as Microsoft Windows Azure [163], EC2 [164] and Rackspace [165].
Virtual machine manager (VMM) [166] of virtualization systems ensure logical isolation
between VMs by creating an internal virtual network. However, the threat of an attack remains.
A myriad of recent studies (as discussed in Section 2.6) have demonstrated how co-residency can
be achieved, and how an attacker can take advantage of shared hardware in cross-VM settings.
In [93][26], researchers have discussed how an attacking VMs can potentially access other VMs
by means of network connections, shared memory, other shared hardware resources and how an
attacking VM can exploit network channel to redirect the network traffic of other co-located VMs
and what are their limitations in the modern cloud model.
Despite the clear potential of cross-VM attacks for abusing the shared memory and disk as
aforementioned in Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 , no actual demonstrations of the fine-grained
cross-VM network-channel attack have been performed. The most commonly discussed challenges
focus on the facts that cloud provider places more layers of isolation between co-resided VMs
than in non-virtualized settings because the attacker and victim are often assigned to sepa-
rate segmentation of virtual networks[46]. However, the proposed attack covertly redirects the
network traffic of victim VM and are hard to detect as they leave little or no traces on the network.
Chapter 3 presented the cloud network model to identify the vulnerability in the state-of-
the-art network architecture of the cloud model. The presented finding indicates that there
are some technical challenges that needs to circumvent to exploit these vulnerabilities. Their
implementation has been presented in the prominent open- source cloud model OpenStack and
commercial cloud model Oracle Ravello system along-with the description of how to address the
challenges to exploit these vulnerabilities which we found in Section 3.2.1.
Problem Statement and Contribution As discussed earlier, multiple VMs are sharing the
same network resources which in turn are vulnerable to attack. But due to strict security
configuration in the cloud network model the exploitation of these vulnerabilities in real-time
scenarios becomes more challenging. This chapter overcomes these security challenges and
designs a zero-day attack model (as mentioned in Section 1.3.1, research goal 1), focusing on
the key components of the underlying network architecture, the technique and the way network
components are connected, processed and applied for the overall model. The main concepts of the
new attack model are validated through the implementation of a real-time system for OpenStack
and Oracle Ravello. A series of experiments were conducted to assess the effectiveness of the
proposed attack model. This aimed to prove the viability of implementing the system in an
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operational context. At the end, defense strategy (as mentioned in Section 1.3.1, research goal
3)for controlling such attacks is also proposed.
4.1.1 Technical Challenges
As demonstrated in a lab testbed, the proposed attack establishes a network channel attack in
which the malicious VM can passively monitor the network traffic of victim VMs by exploiting the
isolation between VMs. Using OpenStack and Ravello cloud system as a case study, demonstration
of the execution of proposed attack as how to place the mirror in internal medium of network
channel in a way that maximizes the likelihood of an advantageous positioning. Having managed
to position a mirror at target location, the next step is to redirect the network traffic of the target
VM at destination point. While there are many avenues for such an attack, the main focus is on
network-channels: cross-VM information leakage due to the sharing of network resources (e.g
network bridge). An earlier attack on network resources [167] used ARP spoofing to redirect the
network traffic of a target VM.
Table 4.1 presents a comparison summary of already existing attacks with our proposed
approach. The second column shows the description of these attacks.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Related Work and Proposed Work
Attack Description Ref.
Side Channel Time-driven [168]
Access-driven [168]
Trace-driven [168]
Covert Channel TCP/IP Steganography [47]
TCP/IP header Steganography [169]
Timing Channel [170], [171].
DoS Illegal use of resources [32, 72, 93]
Network Channel ARP Poisoning [93]
Sniffing [93]
Spoofing [93]
Proposed Approach TAP Impersonation and mirroring
4.2 Attack Setting and Challenges
4.2.1 Attack Setting
The experimental investigations assume that an attacker has through some means achieved
control of a VM co-resident on the same physical computer as the victim VM [56] by compromising
an existing VM that is co-resident with the victim. The main focus is on the OpenStack cloud
platform [172] running on contemporary hardware architectures. The attack setting in this
63
CHAPTER 4. A CROSS-VIRTUAL MACHINE NETWORK CHANNEL ATTACK VIA
MIRRORING AND TAP IMPERSONATION AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURE
experiment is inspired not only by public clouds such as Amazon EC2 and Rackspace, but also by
other OpenStack use cases. For example, many virtual network solutions are configured in the
same way, where co-resided VMs are accommodated in centralized data centres on top of cloud
hypervisor. Another representative use case separates operating systems into several components
with different privilege levels and that are isolated by virtualization [173, 174]. An example of
such systems are Qubes [175], which is an open source operating system running as multiple
virtual machines on a hypervisor. As for the computer architecture, we target modern multi-core
processors. This selection is mainly inspired by current processors used in public clouds such as
Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure. In this experiment, it is assumed that the attacker and victim
are on separate network domains, each are assigned some number of disjoint resources such as
virtual CPUs (VCPUs), virtual networks (VLANs), and virtual storage. All VMs are assigned the
same privilege levels [176].
The attack model assumes that OpenStack ensures logical isolation between mutually un-
trusted co-resident VMs, and that the attacker is unable to exploit software vulnerabilities
that permit it to take control of the entire physical node. The proposed attack, therefore, uses
cross-VM network-channel to redirect network traffic of the victim machine. An example of a
real-time network traffic of victim machines have been considered. Constructing such a network
channel encounters significant challenges in this cross-VM setting. These key challenges have
been discussed and a solution is presented to overcome each of them. The challenges correspond
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Figure 4.1: Main Steps in Network Channel Attack
4.2.2 Challenge 1: Observing the Current Network Architecture
The way OpenStack cloud works as per default secure setting makes spying of network traffic
of the victim VM challenging, particularly when attacker and victims are on separate network
domains. For example, network channel has high potential for spying the network traffic of
victim VMs, but these require some illusions to control the network channel. An attacker must,
therefore, attempt to control the network channel by breaking up the separation of the network
domain to spy the network traffic of the victim. This approach has proven to be successful in
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non-virtualised settings in which attackers that want to spy the network traffic of a victim ex-
ploiting the virtual network. However, no such exploitation of virtual network is suggested in our
proposed scheme as the default security perimeter, i.e Firewall as a Service (FWaaS) of OpenStack
continuously monitors any unusual activity in the current setting of OpenStack cloud and blocks
the attachment of any external devices. Hence, to become a part or to directly access the current
system is the main challenge. Therefore it is difficult to spy the network traffic of a victim VM
in the presence of FWaaS because FWaaS block such spying. Before launching this attack, the
first challenge is to identify a vulnerable target and explore the best ways to exploit it. In or-
der to successfully launch the proposed attack, a single point of entrance is required to get started.
To overcome this challenge, a careful analysis of the current network system is required.
To enter or to be the part of current system is a sequence of successful operations. The initial
step in this sequence is to create an unaware device that does not have a running NIC adapter
and that device should not be the part of an active network, i.e a dummy interface card as a
vector for network channels (as shows by (1) in Figure 4.3). A regular device in a network that is
responsible for data transmission and receiving is a network card. An equivalent device which is
responsible for performing the basic network operations that a normal regular device executes is
required to be created. Some network operations have been performed to recognize it in a system,
i.e data transmission and reception through this device.
Normally, a dummy network interface card works in different ways as compared to regular
network interface card. It gives benefit to those machines whose only communication source i.e
IP connection is a dial-up connection. The concept with standalone hosts is that a single network
device is activated in it, i.e the local loopback device, which is by default assigned an IP address
127.0.0.1. In some circumstances, one needs to communicate with the official IP address of the
local host. As a case study, consider the laptop having hostname ‘test’, to experiment it has been
disconnected from any network. An application running on test need now to send some data to
another application on the same host. By observing test host entries on the path /etc/hosts shows
an IP-address of 172.16.17.21, so the application attempts to send at this address. But in our
experiment, currently, the local loopback interface is the only active interface in this system.
The operating system kernel has absolutely no idea that this IP-address actually refers to itself
locally. Resultantly, the kernel discards the packet by sending an error to the application.
At this point a dummy interface device comes in. It overcomes this challenge by simply
serving as the alternate of the loopback interface. In case of test, it would simply be given the
address of 172.16.17.21 and in the entry table of routing, a host route pointing to it is added.
Every packet for 172.16.17.21 would then be successfully delivered locally. The most suitable
command for this step is:
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ifconfig dummy test
route add test
It is further demonstrated that how this dummy network interface card is connected with
other devices to exploit the security perimeter of OpenStack cloud and to be the part of a current
OpenStack system. This is the first step that gives the advantage to an attacker to become
the part of the system, with the help of other operations, of an existing system and to spy the
network traffic of victims. The strategy used to exploit a security perimeter is a vulnerability in
an OpenStack cloud architecture, resulting in disclosure of privacy of other VMs.
4.2.3 Challenge 2: Hiding the Dummy Network Interface
In the event of OpenStack detecting that the real network card is activated, the next challenge is
to mislead OpenStack’s security perimeter by converting the identity of regular interface into a
TAP (as shows by (2) in Figure 4.3), which acts as a valid device within the network system.
Impersonating the regular interface to TAP is necessary to ensure that we can connect our
device to the network. The TAP acts as an inactive device as it does not interfere in any running
network settings, and is compatible with the network configuration. The functioning of TAP is as:
instead of VM’s vNIC and switch, a TAP is configured in between them and is used to connect
these two devices. A TAP delivers unfiltered complete access to bi-directional traffic streams. The
data is passed between two network devices (i.e. VM’s NIC and switch) in both direction (ingress
and egress). A TAP makes copy of the transmit signals from each device. This certifies that data
is copied and any chance of over-subscription is avoided.
The attacker VM now has two interfaces: (i) a normal Ethernet card, impersonating a TAP
with no valid identity, and (ii) the dummy interface. Next, a connectivity request is sent to
the Linux bridge, which presumes it to be a valid TAP, and adds it using a method similar to
the conventional one. The reason for adding Linux bridge here is that iptables security rules
on this bridge are used to configure the security group rules for the VM. After successfully
completing this phase, the attacker can now penetrate into the network. This impersonation
can be performed within OpenStack by: Manually removing all types of interface identity in the
network configuration file at /etc/network/interfaces and then restarting networking services by
executing /etc/init.d/networking restart that makes this change persistent within the system file.
This results in a network device without a valid identity functioning like a TAP. The difference
between TAP and regular network device can be seen in Figure 4.2. enp0s3 is the regular network
device and test0 is the tap device which has no valid identity.
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Figure 4.2: Difference between Tap0 and eth0
4.2.4 Challenge 3: Observing Network Traffic
Even with the strong feature of security perimeter in an OpenStack cloud, there are still some
vulnerabilities in the current architecture that one can exploit to spy the network traffic of a
victim VM. The best and novel way to spy the network traffic of victim VM in an unobtrusive
way is to redirect the network traffic at attacker’s destination port. This creates two hurdles.
First, who is responsible for redirecting the real time network traffic. Second is the placement
so to hide from others and that gives the maximum advantage. Already existing schemes [93]
failed to provide any assistance in redirecting the network traffic. A novel method: a mirroring
approach to relate network observations for the particular operations of the victim has been used.
This challenge has been overcome by performing the following tasks. The first challenge of the
proposed technique is overcome by implementation of a mirror. To implement this, a mirror has
been used, specifically in Linux. A mirror is a powerful Linux tool that has the ability to redirect
the network traffic from one port to other.
The next challenge is placement of the mirror. The mirror should be placed in a position
that maximizes the likelihood of an advantageous positioning and that must be hidden from
other VMs. This approach requires an illusion because if the mirror has been placed in any open
position of the network, it can be easily detected, and the target VM will be careful in sending
the traffic through that interface and report about traffic spying to the cloud administrator. This
challenge has been overcome by setting up the mirror at the internal interface of the network
bridge that is unobtrusive to all other VMs and this is the most challenging position as the traffic
of all other VMs passes through this interface. In order to set mirror, the following steps need to
be executed at bridge that will set the dummy interface as a destination port.
67
CHAPTER 4. A CROSS-VIRTUAL MACHINE NETWORK CHANNEL ATTACK VIA
MIRRORING AND TAP IMPERSONATION AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURE
create Mirror name=test_mirror
select dst-port=dummy0
set mirror @ br-int
This technique takes advantage of penetrating into the network from where the network
traffic of other VMs passes as shows (3) in fogure 4.3.
4.2.5 Challenge 4: Traffic Redirection at Destination Point
Spying the network traffic of victim VM is a challenging task. If an attacker observe the network
traffic of victim VM at some open network location, there is a probability that attackers’ activity
is being monitored by security perimeter of an Open-Stack cloud and it blocks the attacking
VM. This challenge has been overcome by redirecting the network traffic of victim at the set
hidden destination point. When the network traffic of victim VM passes through the network
bridge where the mirror is configured, it will redirect the network traffic from internal bridge
port towards the set destination port. As with the installation of mirror, it sends a copy of all
network packets seen on one port to another port, where the packets can be analyzed. Due to
this, not only victim VMs but also security perimeter should be unaware about the redirection of
network traffic. This re-direction is performed within OpenStack by the following commands as
shows by (4) in 4.3:
select-src-port=@br-int
select-dst-port=@dummy0
4.2.6 Challenge 5: Obfuscation
After the implementation of all the operations, the challenge is to eliminate all the footprints
of the attack by hiding all the devices and routes which are used in launching this attack. The
key objective of obfuscation is to confuse and diverting examination and monitoring processes
so that the attack is not be traceable [177]. route [178] is a very powerful Linux and other
distribution tool such as Ubuntu that show all the possible static route and interfaces within
a network. The existence of used devices as well as redirected route from route tool and other
network monitoring tools have been concealed. There are many approaches that are used for
obfuscation. After attachment of the impersonated interface to br-int, a Zero will be added out to
this interface, that removes identity of the interface and is not visible in route tool. Due to this
activity, performed action cannot be examined.
4.2.7 Putting it all together
Combining all these stages together allows us to launch a cross-VM network attack as depicted
in Figure 4.3. The vulnerability that is exploited in this attack is cloud provider’s permission
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to bridge a TAP interface with no private Ethernet at the back end which is used to access the
Internet.
veth pair veth pair veth pair veth pair
int-br-eth1































Figure 4.3: Attack Scenario in OpenStack
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4.3 Evaluation Criteria
From Figure 4.3, it is observable that the evaluation framework revolves around the research
methodology discussed in Section 1.4. The main goal of the attack is to redirect the network
traffic of co-located VMs by exploiting the network channel. To achieve this objective, the five
attack strategies are implemented in the network architecture of OpenStack. As network traffic
is a major component of this attack, the evaluation results are mainly dependent on the network
traffic but also partly focus on network resources.
The evaluation criteria are based on the following key reflective qualitative aspects. (i)
Functional shows the accomplishment of the above said five tasks that are important for the
execution of attack.(ii) Expressive indicates how well does the attack methodology do the job. (iii)
Finally, the overall strengths and limitations of the attack has been shown.
4.4 Evaluation
The experiment was conducted in leading open source IaaS cloud platform i.e OpenStack and a
commercial cloud system Oracle Ravello System. The OpenStack and Oracle Ravello cloud model
has been configured with default security perimeter. Firstly, the experimental setup of OpenStack
has been described in detail then in next section Ravello setup has been explained.
4.4.1 Experiment Setup
The configuration running on OpenStack cloud model consists of CPUs, KVM hypervisor and
Linux kernels that are very similar to that used for host OpenStack instances. The configured
architecture avoids two technical complications in conducting the attacks: it ensures that one
VM is completely isolated with others, and secondly, VMs are actively communicating with each
other. In general, the attacker can either passively wait for the victim VM to start communicating
and then to spy message, or can actively spying the communication by redirecting its traffic.
Moreover, a situation has been considered to the attacker’s advantage, in which victim VM is
already communicating with other VMs. It is also important to understand that the designed
architecture is by itself a realistic secure setup for virtualised environments as the configured
setups are similar to real time setups. In fact, in a cloud data center isolation among multiple
VMs may improve the security as one VM cannot interfere the operations of other VMs. It is
thus realised that these attacks are of interest beyond their progress towards an attack within
OpenStack.
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4.4.1.1 Attack Scenario:
The scenario that is used to demonstrate the attack is for an attacker VM (VM1) to intercept and
spy on communication between two target VMs (VM2 and VM3). The placement of the mirror
can then be used to perform redirection of target traffic. The attack has been performed within
OpenStack using multi-node configurations encompassing single node, double node, and triple
node. Three guest VMs have been deployed within a physical machine (Intel Core Z Q9650 @
3.0Ghz) using the KVM hypervisor. VM1 was configured to be the attacker VM that has been
successfully hijacked, while VM2 and VM3 are targets. Each VM is configured with two vCPUs
different operating systems including Ubuntu 15.10(VM1), cirros (VM2), Windows 10 (VM3), are
configured with both floating and private IPs for external network access and internal machine
communication, respectively. Target VMs were configured to send between 0 - 15 Kbps to each
other. All the experiments were repeated 20 times each.
Table 4.2 shows the total resource allocation of all co-located VMs. However, VM resource
utilization statistics of one-week has been tabulated in Table 4.3. The value of resource utilization
mentioned in 4.3 are not fixed; it varies from time to time depending upon the VM and their
running programs. Network traffic has directly no connection with these hardware resources as
network does not put traffic load on disk and memory. Network load can be observed through
network monitoring tool i.e. mrtg[x], prtg[x].
Table 4.2: Resource Allocation of Each VM
Co-located VMs Memory (MB) Disk (GB) CPU
VM1 (small) 512 10 1
VM2 (Medium) 2048 20 2
VM3 (large) 4096 40 3
In Table 4.2, the CPU column shows the number of the virtual CPUs for VMs running on
the physical machine.
The MEMORY MB column shows the memory (in MB) allocated to the VMs running on the
physical machine.
The DISK GB column shows the the root and ephemeral disk sizes (in GB) assigned to VMs
running on the physical machine.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Each VM
Co-located VMs Memory (GB) Disk (GB) CPU (Hours)
VM1 (small) 365.06444 5.15 525.12
VM2 (Medium) 644.09474 9.64 564.83
VM3 (large) 4523.06489 12.45 746.0
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4.4.1.2 Network Setup:
VLAN Manager was configured to ensure VM isolation between co-resident VMs by assigning IP
addresses and VLAN tag within different ranges known to produce physical resource separation.
4.4.1.3 VLAN Manager Setup
When VLAN mode is enabled, each VM has its own VLAN and assigned network. Any phys-
ical switches placed in between must support 802.1q VLAN tagging for this to function. For





4.4.1.4 Association of Public IPs to VMs
A private IP address is automatically assigned when an VM is instantiated. This range of IPs are
only accessible within the local network environment . Public IP addresses are required by the
VM to be accessible to the external network. Manual attachment of a public address consists of
(1) assigning an address from the available IP range, and (2) linking the address with a VM. This
experimental setup must have a valid range of floating IPs assigned to it for allocation. Nova
client has been used:
nova floating-ip-create and associating this address to a VM (such as 172.10.1.1) nova add-
floating-ip <VM-id> 172.10.1.1
This allows for communication with VMs that contain public IP address.
4.4.1.5 Security Configuration
Networking uses iptables to achieve security group functionality, but iptables support linear
storage and filtering. In order to improve security group’s performance, ipset is preferable. So,
ipset option is enabled in networking to improve security group performance by denoting a hash
table. When a new port is created, an additional ipset option is added to the iptables chain. If
the security group that the port belongs to contains rules shared by other groups, the group
member is added to the ipset chain. If a group member is changed by using ipset, iptables rules
are updated instead of being reloaded. Therefore, a new VM security group has been initiated by
first individually checking for new security group names.
4.4.1.6 Managing Security Groups
Security groups are configured on the nova-compute host responsible for VM execution, enabling
safeguarding of the host machine by limiting access and preventing intrusion of other VMs
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running on the same host. A security group has been launched on port 22, which is the default
port for security group. The design of a security group requires two phases,
i Defining a group by using the command nova secgroup-create.
ii Setting rules in the group using nova secgroup-add-rule:
• For ingress traffic, only traffic matched with security group rules is permitted. All other
traffic is dropped, if there is no rule matched.
• For egress traffic, only traffic matched with security group rules is permitted. All egress
traffic is dropped, if there is no rule defined.
• When a new security group is created, rules are automatically added to allow/disallow
all ingress/egress traffic.
4.4.2 Assumption
The main assumption in our designed attack model presumes that an attacker has managed
to take control of a VM residing on same physical machine as the target VM [56]. Researchers
have already demonstrated success of this control by using a network-based approach to launch
co-location attack within a pubic cloud such as Amazon EC2 [56]. They showed that an attacker
is able to launch many VM instances within the same geographical region as the target VM, and
applying different schemes to locate whether a VM is co-located successfully. Following is the
summary of such schemes that helps in identifying the location:
• By running a trace-route program such as TCP SYN to detect the first hop of network
traffic (e.g. Dom0 in the host Xen server) between attacker and target VM. The finding
of this program indicates that if there is an identical Dom0 IP address means attacker is
successful in finding co-location of target VM.
• Analyze round-trip time (RTT) [179] of network packet between attacker and target VM. A
smaller value of RTT indicates that the two VMs share the same physical machine.
• Check internal IP addresses of attacker and target VM. Numerically close internal IP
addresses reflects that the two VMs are more likely to be on the same server.
4.5 Analysis of Result
This section describes the in-depth evaluation of the experimental results of the overall approach
through the real-world scenario in terms of capturing the network traffic and network resources
utilization by VMs. The single result alone is not sufficient to make a firm conclusion about
the feasibility of the underlying attack strategy. Therefore, the effectiveness of the proposed
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technique is evaluated using network traffic capturing and network resource utilization.
Network Traffic Capture To validate the attack strategy, a collection of network traffic
captured from the testbed is analysed. Each experimental run yields redirected network traffic
that is labeled with the ground truth regarding the presence of an attack.
The real-time attack scenario is- Target VMs (VM2 and VM3) are communicating to each
other by sending ping command. By applying an attack methodology as discussed in section 4.2,
the attacking machine VM1 is able to observe the traffic between target VMs as shown in Figure
4.4. In Figure 4.4, the attacking VM is getting an ICMP echo reply. ICMP is an protcol running
behind ping command. echo request and echo reply shows the successful communication between
two the VMs.
The attack is effective when it is possible to determine sender and receiver communication
between target VMs (e.g., packet header source IP address). If VMs communicate at the same
time, the attacker is unable to distinguish the origin of VM traffic.
Figure 4.4: Traffic Capturing at Attacking VM
Network Resource Utilization
Subsequently network traffic is generated within each VM when an attack is performed. Figure
4.5 shows VM network traffic prior, during, and post attack. Experiment time between 0 to 30
minutes depicts that the attacking VM1 exhibits random network traffic not dissimilar to that of
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VM2 and VM3 (point A). The attack commences at 25 minutes (point B), where it is observable
that the attacking VM1 consumes substantial network traffic compared to target VMs, and
continues to do so for 6 minutes until attack completion (point C). The reason for this sudden






















Figure 4.5: Normal Co-residing VM-Network Traffic
When observing network traffic of VM1 in comparison to other VMs during the entire
experiment, it is possible that the cloud administrator could detect this as anomalous behavior
due to the sudden spike in network usage. This may lead to further investigation, or deploying a
simple countermeasure to restrict VM network traffic that reaches a defined threshold. However,
it is believed that in the context of cloud computing such a counter measure would be challenging
to detect. Firstly in many public cloud settings, VM resource usage are seen as black boxes by the
provider. As long as resource demands do not violate resource capacity requested by a customer,
this is seen as typical behavior. Secondly, even if the system is attempting to monitor atypical
resource patterns using bandwidth monitoring tools such as prtg [180], countermeasures will
likely include a time delay for determining irregular resource patterns. Therefore, even a few
minutes of a VM being compromised may be sufficient for an attacker to achieve his objectives.
For example, in 2008 the defense solution of a system operated by the Georgia Government
during an HTTP attack [181] activated for 5 minutes after the attack had been launched. Finally,
detection of atypical network traffic patterns becomes incredibly difficult if the attacking VM is
capable of creating cyclical network patterns prior to an attack, as shown in figure 4.6.
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The potential countermeasure strategy for such cases is to place a Network intrusion detection
systems (NIDS) [182] at a points within the network to monitor traffic to and from all sources on
the network.It performs a traffic analysis at different time intervals and compare the traffic to
find out the attacks. Once an abnormal behavior in network traffic is observed, the alert can be
sent to the administrator. But in our case, the attacking machine is generating the same amount
of traffic periodically and in the third peak as shown in Figure 4.6 executes an attack following a
similar resource pattern seen previously (point A to B). Hence, the abnormality in traffic pattern
cannot be observed. In this particular case, ideally the administrator would need to scan all
inbound and outbound traffic, but the limitation in doing so might create a bottleneck that would

















Figure 4.6: Cyclic Attack Pattern of Network Traffic
A larger network system is also considered to evaluate the attack as shown in Figure 4.7. In
this scenario, 10 VMs have been considered. Subsequently network traffic is generated within
each VM when an attack is performed. Figure 4.7 shows VM network traffic prior, during, and
post-attack. Experiment time between 0 to 30 minutes depicts that the attacking VM1 exhibits
random network traffic not dissimilar to that of target VMs (point A). The attack commences at 25
minutes (point B), where it is observable that the attacking VM1 consumes substantial network
traffic compared to target VMs, and continues to do so for 6 minutes until attack completion (point
C). The reason for this sudden increase is because all target VM network traffic is redirected
through the attacking VM. Post routing traffic graph ’prtg’ [180] is used to capture network traffic
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of all VMs.
Figure 4.7: Cyclic Attack Pattern of Network Traffic
4.6 Attack on Ravello Systems
The same attack could be evaluated on Ravello Systems, Oracle’s cross-cloud platform. Oracle
Ravello is a commercial cloud platform that allows the use of any of the leading public clouds such
as GCE, AWS, etc. In our testbed, AWS is configured to be the underlying IaaS provider. Ravello
offers unique cloud application hypervisor technology facilitating enterprises and individuals to
encapsulate completely and abstract an entire multi-VM application and its environment so that
it can run on any cloud (public or private) without any modifications.
4.6.1 Network Configuration
Ravello allows to set up the network configuration for each of the VMs including static IPs. One
needs to assign the static IP, Netmask, Gateway and DNS server for this interface. Ravello
support the feature of SDN that automatically creates a virtual switch based on the IP address
assign to VM and netmask of the interfaces. All interfaces that have same subnet are assign
to the same virtual switch. If a gateway has been assigned at user interface, then its SDN will
follow the following properties:
1. The guest VM has been assigned a gateway IP (i.e the VM has been configured to serve as
a router), then Ravello’s SDN settings will be in accordance with the VM’s Gateway setting.
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2. If the guest VM does not have a Gateway IP, Ravello’s SDN will add a virtual Router with
the defined Gateway IP, and add it to the virtual switch.
3. If a default Gateway is not defined on Ravello’s user interface, Ravello’s SDN will simply do
nothing.
4.6.2 Evaluation
As shown in figure 4.8, all VMs belong to different VLAN Tags. VLAN tagging is defined in IEEE
802.1Q [183]. Network parts in which VLAN is enabled can include VLAN tags. when a packet
enters into the network part in which VLAN is configured, a tag is added to show the VLAN
membership. VLAN ensures the isolation between network traffic of all VMs.Figure 4.8 also
shows the network configuration of all three VMs.
Figure 4.8: VLAN Configuration of VMs in Oracle Ravello System
4.6.3 Aalysis of Result
As shown in Figure 4.8, the attacking VM is able to successfully observe the network traffic
between target VMs that are communicating through ping command. In this Figure 4.8,the
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attacking VM is getting the ICMP echo request and reply which shows that both target VMs
are communicating with each other. As mentioned, ICMP is the protocol running behind ping
command and echo request and reply shows that both VMs are talking to each other. VM3 which
is an attacking VM having no access rights to monitor the communication between other VMs on
network channel.
Figure 4.9: Traffic Capturing at Attacking VM in Oracle Ravello System
4.7 Limitations
The proposed approach works well but is limited to the selection of network model. Cloud
provider normally uses Openvswitch (OVS) for the implementation of advance network setting.
The case study used in our experiment describes a state-of-the-art configuration of the Open Stack
networking feature by applying the VLAN and ML2 plugin in OVS. This attack only works on
neutron network facilitated by OVS which can support the different advance features of network
design and security. It does not work on legacy network i.e. nova-network. The latter model has
some limitations, i.e., it can’t facilitate the designing of an advance network architecture. Nova-
networking was the only network solution prior to the implementation of Neutron in OpenStack.
Nova-network only support FLAT network and DHCP services. It is the part of OpenStack till
now, but it seems to be obsolete because of its limitations. Normally Flat network or DHCP
followed the same model. The main concept is that all the VMs are attached to the bridge i.e
Linux bridge. The bridge is attached to physical host where there is a support of physical NIC i.e.
eth0. Multiple VMs are connected to this bridge. This concept model is shown in Figure 4.10.
Table 4.4 depicts the different cloud providers vulnerable to this attack.
4.8 Inhibiting the Network-Channel Attack
There are several possibilities for promising defences against cross-VM network-channels, whose
pros and cons are discussed here.
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Figure 4.10: Nova-Network
Table 4.4: An Overview of the Vulnerability of Different Cloud Systems to the Proposed Approach
Cloud Provider Vulnerable to
attack
Reason
OpenStack Yes Allow bridging of a TAP interface that does not
have a private Ethernet interface at backend.
Ravello System Yes Allow bridging of a TAP interface that does not
have a private Ethernet interface at backend.
Microsoft Azure No Prohibited to connect a TAP interface with
bridge having no Ethernet at backend.
Google CE No Prohibited to connect a TAP interface with
bridge having no Ethernet at backend.
4.8.1 Avoiding Co-residency
Within secure environments, a longstanding strategy is simply not to use the same hardware to
execute the tasks that should be separated from each other, i.e., to keep a time gap between the
tasks. This strategy provides the best high-assurance defence against side-channel (and many
other) attacks. However, this strategy would avoid many of the existing and upcoming practices
of VMs, including public clouds that multiplex physical servers such as Amazon EC2, Windows
Azure, and Rackspace, and the other VM-powered applications discussed in the chapter 1 of this
thesis.
4.8.2 Potential Attack Mitigation Strategies
There exist several relevant works that could be used to mitigate cross-VM attacks. Work from
Zhang et al. [168] proposed to utilize side-channels as a detector to identify illegal co-residency
based on the timing channel (accessing L2 cache response time) while Afoulk et al. [184] attempt
to avoid conflict of interest among VMs via priority based scheduling. Another approach would be
to directly modify the open source code of OpenStack. It limits the granularity of network based
side-channels and penetration of any external device into the current running system. Multiple
VM interfaces connect to the OVS internal network bridge, i.e br-int that further connects with
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the physical device and external network. The attacker itself in the internal network through
impersonating of the TAP interface which does not have a private Ethernet interface.
Figure 4.11 shows the output of OVS that displays the connectivity of different virtual
Interfaces.
Figure 4.11: Connectivity of Virtual Interfaces at OVS
After deep analysis of the output, it has been observed that each valid interfaces have two
attributes: tag and type. ‘Tag’ associated with Interfaces describes that VLAN is enabled in order
to ensure the isolation between VMs and ‘type’ shows the behaviour of the interfaces. Figure 4.12
shows the attachment of dummy interface named as ‘test0’.
One can see that there is no attribute of this dummy interface i.e ‘tag’ and ‘type’ both at-
tributes are missing in the output of OpenvSwitch.
As OpenStack code is an open source, it is identified through close monitoring of Open-
Stack code that the security weakness resides within the networking (neutron) component
of OpenStack cloud. As a result, there is a need to amend in neutron code within the class
/opt/stack/neutron/agent/impl_vsctl.py that includes a method which executes virtual switch
operations def run_vsctl(self,args). A new method has been included get_all_bridges(self,args)
that collects all the information of connected interfaces at the bridge. The purpose of this function
is to determine whether the connected interface can communicate using only the TAP interface,
81
CHAPTER 4. A CROSS-VIRTUAL MACHINE NETWORK CHANNEL ATTACK VIA
MIRRORING AND TAP IMPERSONATION AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURE
Figure 4.12: Attachment of Dummy Interface
and if capable, block direct connection of all TAP interfaces with an OVS bridge accessing the
Internet with the same Ethernet. Analysis of the interface reveals that each valid interface has
three attributes: tag, interface and type. ’Tag’ describes that the VLAN is enabled to ensure
VM isolation, ’interface’ shows its association with back-end private Ethernet and ’type’ reveals
interface behavior. The security checks need to ensure all these ’TAP’ attributes before connecting
to the bridge.
After the amendment in a neutron code, the attempts to attach a dummy virtual interface
with OpenVSwitch (OVS), OpenStack cloud creates an error by displaying that it is an invalid
interface as shown in Figure 4.13.
4.9 Discussion
This section discusses the major findings from the empirical evaluation of TAP impersonation
attack presented in this chapter.
• TAP Impersonation and the mirroring attack were implemented by the exploitation of
the network channel. TAP Impersonation was the first step to penetrate into the network
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Figure 4.13: Blockage of Invalid Interface
system. Mirror was configured at the central bridge to redirect the network traffic to set
hidden destination point. The bridge was focused as VMs network traffic are passed through
it. The results showed that the presented attack successfully redirects the network traffic
of co-located VMs which indicates the exploitation of cloud network architecture.
• It was observed that the presented attack redirects high rate network traffic of co-located
VMs at hidden destination point which can be seen from the network traffic graph. PRTG
was found to be the most appropriate network traffic graph monitoring technique for
measuring the network bandwidth of each VM in real-time. Sudden spikes were observed
in the graph which indicates the success of the attack.
• It was interesting to examine that this attack setting can be blocked for exploitation. The
attacker can penetrate into the network system by impersonating the TAP interface. By
carefully analysis the attribute of real-TAP, it has been observed that impersonated TAP
has different attributes which can be blocked through modification in source code of open
source cloud.
• Evaluation criteria (Section 4.3) has been satisfied via:
Functional qualitative parameter, the attack methodology is evaluated to check whether
it accomplishes all the tasks for which it is designed. The functional parameter is evaluated
by looking at its inference ability as shown in Figure 4.3 in which all these attack strategies
have been implemented. Moreover, the results showed that all the events were inferred
successfully. The evaluation showed that the attack model fulfilled the functional purpose.
Expressiveness, in the context of this thesis, is defined as how well the TAP Imper-
sonation attack works the full range of tasks when used within the network domain. The
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expressive parameter is evaluated by looking at the results in Figure 4.4 which provides
the network traffic capturing of other co-located VMs that are the strong evidence about
the working of attack.
From the evaluation of the results, it is demonstrated that the major strength of the
presented approach is its ability to redirect the network traffic of other co-located VMs.
However, the presented approach suffered from some limitations that are described in
Section 4.7.
4.10 Summary
In summary and compared to work reported in the literature on cross-VM attack, the chapter
presents:
Details of experiment, their setup, configuration, limitations and mitigation strategy in
order to evaluate this attack in a real-time scenario. Launching of cross-VM network channel
attack within an open source cloud platform i.e OpenStack is also presented. Divide and conquer
methodology has been used to explore the security flaw in the cloud model. Attack settings and
challenges have also been elaborated to show how challenging is for attacker to penetrate into
the network system and how to circumvent the security perimeter of the cloud system. VM’s
configuration has been discussed to show the VM’s properties and settings.
The presented attack uses a combination of impersonating a TAP interface and constructing
a network mirror in the bridge interface, where network traffic of all co-located VMs passes. The
experiment is designed to obtain ground truth to monitor the network traffic of co-located VMs
by exploiting the underlying network channel. The empirical evaluation shows that the attackers
successfully redirect the network traffic of co-located VMs by using the attack strategy. It is very
challenging for cloud providers to detect and observe such attacks because attacking VM does not
violate assigned VM resource capacity. Countermeasure solution has also been presented to block
this type of attack by fixing the loophole in the code of OpenStack.
The next chapter provides a complete description of our next finding through experiments on










PRIVILEGE ESCALATION ATTACK AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURE
As discussed in chapter 2, the researchers have demonstrated different approaches formemory exploitation and explored vulnerabilities in kernel code. This exploitation in turndemands placement of hardening systems to inhibit privilege escalation attacks. As there
is strict memory isolation mechanisms between the kernel and user space, like Intel’s SMEP,
attackers gradually depend upon code reuse methods to exploit vulnerabilities especially those
that are kernel related. Contrary to analogous attacks in more preventive configurations, such
as web browsers, non-privileged limited opponents have great flexibility in exploiting memory
disclosure vulnerabilities to dynamically determine, or conclude, the location of certain code
segment and design code-reuse contents. Recent research has publicized that the connection of
code variation with the implementation of a “read XOR execute” (RXˆ) memory security strategy
is an operative defense against the misuse of user- land software, but so far this method has not
been implemented for the defense of kernel itself [185].
The purpose of this study is to investigate the implication of hypervisor vulnerabilities
in cloud computing. In this study, a novel attacking scheme has been unveiled on cross-VM
cloud environment having Xen hypervisor running underneath. The core responsibility of the
hypervisor is to ensure proper isolation between domains, i.e root and non-root domain. The
proposed approach exploit return-oriented programming (ROP) model. An adversary having
limited privilege reside on the same physical machine where target VM is, may launch ROP,
establish a connection with root domain by abusing the network channel and get the possession of
tool stack which they are not authorize to access it directly. ROP technique has been investigated
in cross-VM settings, in which a malicious VM reuse the existing code that is already stored in
the Kernel memory and don’t modify or inject any external program for its execution. Through
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this technique, the attackers are successful in exploiting the integrity protections. The findings
indicate that the proposed attack is feasible in contemporary public clouds i.e OpenStack, Azure
where Xen para-virtualization is configured underneath. In conjunction with our findings, a
countermeasure solution has also been proposed to the described attack. This indicates that the
offered cross-VM attack is of applied significance in cloud platform. The results of this research
illustrates that there is a serious security threat to leading cloud providers.
5.1 Introduction
A myriad of previous research have demonstrated how hypervisor are used to enhance the se-
curity of VMs running on it [33, 186, 187, 187–191]. Their main theory is that the hypervisor is
a software that consists of a small piece of code as compared to operating systems therefore it
can comprehensively be examined, as a result its reduces bugs on its code. But modern services
of hypervisors such as Xen, VMware are complicated and they are huge softwares having large
lines of codes, which falsify the hypothesis i.e Xen 4.1.2 has around 350K line of source code
in hypervisor itself. The best formal authentication technology today can only deal with 10K
lines of source code [103]. It is not favorable to formally vet such a large code of hypervisor.
Additionally, National Vulnerability Database [192] list down the latest security breaches in
hypervisors software by expressing that it is not simple to present bug-free hypervisor software.
These exposures make hypervisors the target of attackers [193–195].
The main objective of software attack is to distract the running program flow and execute
some other instructions. The term software attack is generally used in different types of appli-
cations ranging from desktop to eeb to simple program such as notepad. A more detailed form
of software attack is the exploitation of memory vulnerability that appears in many kinds such
as buffer overflow, heap overflow and string vulnerability [196]. Buffer Overflow vulnerability
[197] is the most serious threat in which an attacker can overflow buffers in the stack process
and overwrite the return address of a function with random memory address. The attacker can
take advantages of such overwriting by executing any code when the vulnerable function returns.
Researchers has executed this attack in many different forms and their mitigation solution has
also been proposed in numerous forms. Their mitigation solutions avoid code execution that
is present in the data regions of the process, for example in stack or/and heap. Contemporary
operating systems includes Data Execution Prevention (DEP) using the security model [198].
In these models, the memory location cannot perform both tasks simultaneously, it can either
be executable or writable. By doing so, the attacker cannot write and execute code at the same
address of stack /heap.
Despite the deployment of such countermeasure strategies, attackers still are able to find
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the gaps to execute proposed code by re-using of already existing code in the process address
space instead of injecting new code. A well-known category of this attack is the return-into-libc
attack, designed by Solar [199]. In this attack, the attacker overwrites the return address of a
vulnerable function with the address of any function in the libc library. For example, the attacker
can overwrite with the address of a ‘system’ function through which a shell can be opened. A
shell is a dominant backdoor which supports in executing multiple tasks. Return-Oriented Pro-
gramming(ROP) is a precise form of the return-into-libc attack, in which the attacker attempts to
implement parts of code dispersed through the process address space by connecting them with
unintended transfer instructions, typically the ‘ret’ instruction.
As proposed by Shacham [15, 197], in ROP the attacker usually implements the attack in two
phases:
1. In the first phase, the attacker detects the sequence of instructions suitable in performing
the planned jobs. This short set of instructions is called a gadget and normally is from 2 to
5 set of instructions in length. However, there is no limitation on the gadgets’ length and it
has not been verified that it is in-feasible to have longer gadgets. Also the potential for the
attacker to find more than one gadget is also possible.
2. In the second stage, the attacker connects these known gadgets (from the first step) together
in such a way that they are executed successively.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of RoP
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The attacker first discovers a vulnerable function in the process address space, either related to
the application or a part of external or internal libraries. This vulnerable function would then
be executed during the actual program execution. The attacker overwrite the stack data with
the proposed return addresses (i.e the start addresses of the gadgets). The gadgets should end
in unintended control transfer instruction, typically the ‘ret’ instruction assists this purpose.
Every time the actual operation (gadget) is executed, the ‘ret’ instruction at the end of the
gadget pops next value (that is the next gadget’s address) in the stack, which becomes the new
execution instruction. The attacker may also insert data values into the stack which can be used
as arguments for the proposed instructions to be executed [197, 200–203].
The mentioned technique which is first recognized and described uses only the ‘return’ in-
struction for redirecting the control flow of the program and moves it to the proposed program’s
flow. But “return” instruction is not the only way of moving the control. There are some other
control transfer instructions such as the indirect ‘imp’ and indirect ‘call’ instruction, which store
the address of the target instructions. Therefore, the attacker now has the choice to use such
instructions as well to redirect the flow and execute code that they propose. Checkoway.et.al [204]
proposed Return-Oriented Programming use return like instructions rather than directly using
the return instruction. For example, the instruction sequence ’pop’ is similar to a ‘ret’ instruction
which pops the top of stack to register and executes the instructions at address.
In cloud computing the hypervisor is responsible for creating domain isolation between the
root and non-root VMs. However, the hypervisor is a software that consists of multiple lines of
code that are vulnerable to attack. Researchers have already presented numerous approaches in
recent studies (as discussed in section 2.9.2) to attack the hypervisor in a way how an attacker
using ROP to escalate the privilege level of non-root users, and how an attacker can inject an
external program in system memory for arbitrary execution. In [210] researchers have explicitly
shows how an attacker can alter the privilege value of non-root VM stored in memory for privilege
escalation.
Despite the clear potential of privilege escalation attacks by abusing RoP and shared memory
as discussed in Section 2.9, fine-grained privilege escalation attack that practices ROP in con-
junction with the cross-VM network-channel attack has not yet been performed. The fact is that
hypervisor has enhanced the security level by placing more layers of isolation through domains
between VMs. VMs reside in their respective domains according to their privilege level. Due to
which, cloud architecture does not seem to have a threat of such attacks because VMs having
different privileges level and are resides at different domains.
Chapter 3 presented hypervisor architecture and their domain properties (in Section 3.3)
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where the investigation is made to find the vulnerability in the state-of-the-art hypervisor. The
presented finding indicates that there are some challenges that needs to circumvent to exploit
these vulnerabilities. Their implementation has been presented in the next section in the leading
open source cloud models OpenStack and Microsoft Azure along with the description of how to
address these challenges to exploit the vulnerabilities found in Section 3.2.
In this chapter, an advance innovative attack methodology called privilege escalation has been
presented. It abuses ROP in conjunction with network-channel to launch an attack in cross-VM
settings and shed some light on the security, or lack thereof, in the multi-tenant infrastructure
cloud environment. The main aim of this investigation is not to comprehensively study how
vulnerable the cloud servers are, rather the isolation properties of cloud systems have been
explored, as virtual machines and hypervisors can be circumvented by the proposed attack (and
if so, how?), if the underlying hardware become vulnerable.
Problem Statement and Contribution As discussed earlier, Cloud providers place multiple
VMs on the same hardware. Each VMs have been assigned privilege levels and hypervisor place
them in their respective domains according to their privilege levels. But the attacker can escalate
the privilege level of its VM by exploiting the domain isolation properties. However in cloud
computing, strict security features are configured that protect from such exploitation. Such
exploitations in real-time scenarios are becoming more challenging.
This chapter overcome these security challenges by investigating the RoP and their associated
techniques. Moreover, designing a zero-day attack model (as mentioned in Section 1.3.1, research
goal 2), mainly focusing on the key components of the underlying hypervisor architecture, the
technique and the way domains are connected, processed and applied for the overall model is also
presented in this chapter. The main concept of the proposed attack model is validated through
the implementation of real-time systems for OpenStack and Oracle Ravello. Experimental series
was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack model. This aimed to prove the
practicality of implementing the system in an operational context. In the end, defense strategy
(as mentioned in Section 1.3.1, research goal 3) for controlling such attacks is also presented.
5.1.1 Technical Challenges
Development and application of a cross-VM privilege escalation attack are presented in this
study. All VMs have been assigned different privilege level in cloud environment. The ‘privilege
escalation attack’ is the attack that escalate the privilege level of unprivileged VMs [195]. In
cloud environment, one virtual machine normally declared as a privileged VM reside in dom0
and there are multiple unprivileged VMs in domU. Hypervisor ensures isolation between all
such VMs by placing them in different domains. Like many attacks, the proposed attack is a
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privilege escalation attack in which the attacker VM escalate its privilege level by exploiting
the ROP technique and abuses the network channel to establish a connection with root domain.
However, many of the phases performed to achieve the proposed attack effectively and with high
precision in a virtualized environment are novel in this research. In particular, an account has
been provided of how to overcome the significant challenges of privilege escalation and connection
with root domain. This attack is so influential that if an attacker is successful in escalating the
privilege level of his VM, he can destroy other VMs residing on the same physical machine. This
attack can also cause a DOS attack on the physical machine by creating multiple malicious VMs
that unnecessary engaged physical resources.
5.2 Attack Scenario
In this section, the capability of a malicious VM is demonstrted that exploit ROP technique to
escalate privilege level by abusing the network channel. It has been shown explicitly that after
gaining the privilege rights, it enables an attacker to take over the control of Toolstack through
which it can manage the other co-resided VMs. Controlling Toolstack is not only pretty valuable
to attackers but also serious threat to other VMs and cloud providers. The introduction of many
novel applications to execute this attack has been presented: penetration into the root domain,
illegal possession of Toolstack and the usage of ROP in conjunction with network channel. All
these steps have been practically performed on the running OpenStack cloud testbed.
5.2.1 The Attack
There is a potential to take over the control of Toolstack in hypervisor at dom0 through the
attacking machine. Toolstack is responsible for operating other VMs co-resided on the same
physical machine. The main focus of this research is to circumvent the security perimeter of
OpenStack by introducing the concept of code RoP and then to exploit the network channel. By
compromising the network channel, the attacker manage to penetrate into the domain i.e dom0 of
running system where the privileges VMs resides. The network connections through which other
cloud systems can be connected or OpenStack allow its expansion are needed to be throughly
investigated.
In OpenStack cloud having Xen architecture running underneath, the root or admin VMs
resides at dom0 and are able to access the underlying hardware directly. These root/admin VMs
have special privileges i.e. they are able to control the other VMs. Dom0 is the first machine
started by the system. There is a special stack (called as Toolstack) in this domain that allows a
VM to manage virtual machine creation, destruction and resource allocation. Guest VMs reside
in domU, an unprivileged domain, can’t directly access the hardware. These guest VMs can’t
interfere in other guests’ operations and management. 1) In an attacking guest VM which is in
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domU, a special feature of OpenStack named as OpenStack client has been configured. The main
concept behind the configuration of this special feature of OpenStack is that through this feature,
a malicious VM copied the code of OpenStack in its own domain i.e domU. By doing so, the special
technique of RoP i.e code-reuse has been applied in its internal memory. This in-memory code is
already testified and scrutinized by security perimeter of OpenStack and is already in running
form. Hence security perimeters are unable to block it. The main benefit of code-reusing scheme
in guest VM is that this malicious guest VM becomes a host of its own local machine (sub-host
from main root). After being a host of its own local machine, it has been granted a “dom0” for
managing its own sub-guest VMs. This model looks like a tree in which there is one main root
that resides in dom0 and that have further guest VMs that belongs to domU. Among these guest
VMs, one guest VM is acting as a root of its local system which has its own guests VMs, but
globally it acts as a sub-root.
This malicious guest VMs avail both the privileges (dom0 and domU). Dom0 to manage its
own local guests VMs which can be further subleted and domU which is added in his account by
its inherent characteristic. There is a special python API in dom0 i.e xapi that make a connection
between other domains through network bridge i.e. br0. In order to make a connection between
domU and dom0, a special python API i.e XenAPI at domU is used to connect with xapi of dom0.
This connection follows a network path from Ethernet device to bridge and it uses internal
management network to reach from domU to dom0.
2) In proposed attack scenario, an adversary established a connection with dom0 by connecting
veth bridge pair that connects xapi with xapi of python library. In veth bridge pair, one bridge
already exists in main root and other bridge is the part of the malicious guest VM that he
acquires by applying code reusing technique. 3) Whenever, xapi connects with other xapi through
bridge, it presumes that root of one cloud is attempting to connect with root of other cloud for
cloud expansion or for hybrid cloud and it automatically allows the connection. Due to this, the
attacking machine is penetrates into dom0, gain the root privileges and takes over the control of
tool stack through which thye can manage other guest VMs. After gaining control of Toolstack
the attacker is not only able to manage the other guest VMs running on same physical machine
but can also cause DoS attack by creating unnecessary VMs and assigning them huge amount of
resources. Figure 5.2 depicts the concept of attack model on OpenStack Xen architecture.
5.3 Evaluation Criteria
From Figure 5.2, it can be seen that evaluation revolves around the attack methodology discussed
in Section 5.2.1. The main goal of the attack is to escalate the privilege level of non-root VMs so
it can perform the operation of root VM by controlling tool stack from where it can manage other
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Figure 5.2: Attack Model on OpenStack Xen Architecture
co-located VMs. To achieve this objective, the attack strategies discussed in section 5.2.1, are
implemented to evaluate the result. The evaluation of the results is mainly dependent on ROP.
The evaluation criteria are based on the following key reflective qualitative aspects. (i)
Functional shows the accomplishment of the above said five tasks that are important for the
execution of attack.(ii) Expressive indicates how well does the attack methodology does the job.
(iii) Finally, the overall strengths and limitations of the attack have been shown.
5.4 Evaluation
The experimentation on attack described in chapter 5 is conducted in leading open source IAAS
cloud platform i.e OpenStack and commercial cloud system Microsoft Azure System. Following
configurations have been implemented on the system.
5.4.1 Experiment setup
OpenStack Networking supports all advance networking features for the Virtual Networking
Infrastructure (VNI) and the access layer phases of the Physical Networking Infrastructure (PNI).
It activates VMs to configure advance topologies of virtual network which may entails features
such as a firewall, load balancer, and virtual private network (VPN). Networking facilitates some
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other features like networks, subnets, and routers. Each features have different functionality that
act like its physical counterpart: networks consist of subnets, and routers route traffic between
different subnets and networks. Any configured networking set up has at least one external
network and one or more internal networks. VMs are directly connected to these software-defined
networks. Networking routers are needed to access VMs that are outside the network. Each
router has two interfaces; one is connected to an external network and other for an internal
network. Similar to physical router, subnets can be used to access machines on other subnets.
5.4.2 Security Configuration
Security is a strong feature of cloud computing. OpenStack networking supports security groups
that enable administrators to set firewall rules in groups. It is a combination of different security
group rules which specify the network access rules. VMs can belong to one or more security
groups. The main role of security groups are to block or unblock ports, define port ranges or
define network traffic types, their routes for VMs. Networking also supports security groups. All
configured Network setups apply a security group plug-ins to enhance the security feature of
OpenStack networking.
5.4.3 Attack Setup
In this section, the progress on the use of ROP i.e code reuse has been presented. Due to ROP,
the attacker escalate the privilege rights of malicious VM then exploit the network channel as a
means for launching the proposed attack. In this attack, the adversary’s goal is to control the
Toolstack in dom0 and manage other co-resided VMs. The connection with root (dom0) can then
be used to penetrate into root domain (dom0) and control Toolstack through which the attacker
can control victims. In [103], the attacker was supposed to use ROP technique to compromise
hypervisor by editing its code to escalate the privilege level. In OpenStack cloud setup, the
proposed attack has been launched by using ROP in conjunction with network channel. When
VMs are running at real-time on cloud platform their complete management can be controlled
through Toolstack in Xen architecture. The malicious VM which can manage to escalate the
privilege level by circumventing the security perimeter, may be able to get the possession of
Toolstack. If the attacker is successful in controlling the tool stack, they can not only control all
other VMs running on the same platform but also launch DoS attack on physical machine.
5.4.4 Attack Scenario
Based on the attack described in chapter 5, the evaluation for effectiveness of the proposed attack
on the designed architecture of OpenStack setup is explained here. Two VMs have been launched
to evaluate the attack. One can launch more VMs upon requirement. After the launching of VMs,
next step is to configure an Operating Systems (OS) on all these VMs. It’s a choice of client to
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configure any type of Operating System in its VMs. For testing purpose, different Operating
systems have been configured on all VMs. First VM is configured with Ubuntu 15.10, Window is
loaded on second VM. All two VMs are configured with two types of IPs, i.e floating and private.
Floating IP is used to access the external world, i.e the Internet. However, private IP is used
for the internal communication between VMs. All these VMs are assigned to different network
segmentation to ensure logical isolation between them.
Figure 5.3: Attacking Machine Console
5.5 Analysis Results
This section describes the in-depth evaluation of the experimental results of the overall approach
through the real-world scenario in terms of the exploitation of domains by hijacking the ToolStack
and physical resources utilization by VMs. The effectiveness of the proposed technique is evalu-
ated using the following metrics 1) root operation performed by non-root VM and 2) hardware
resource utilization of the attacking VM before and after the attack.
NoN-Root VM Performing Root Operations To validate the attack strategy, a collection
of root commands generated by the (attacker) non-root VM from the testbed is analysed. Each
experimental run shows these commands that are labeled with the ground truth regarding the
presence of attack.
Figure 5.3 shows the login screen of an attacking machine (a1) by using ssh command that
demands key pair which was configured during instance creation. Attacking VM after applying
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the attack scheme, not only manage to escalate its privilege level but also establish a connection
with root domain i.e dom0. After successful connection, the attacking VM hijack a Toolstack
through which they may be able to add or delete the target VMs as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Co-located VM Deletion Command
An attacking machine after controlling the Toolstack can also launch DoS attack on physical
machine by creating an unnecessary VMs and reserve a large amount of resources. After running
the attack, status of test instance on OpenStack server can be seen in Figure 5.5. The instance
list after the deletion operation is shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.5: Co-located VM Deletion
95
CHAPTER 5. PRIVILEGE ESCALATION ATTACK AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURE
Figure 5.6: VMs List After Deletion
Resource Allocation Table 5.1 shows the total resource allocation of all co-located VMs. How-
ever, one-week resource utilization statistics of each VM has been tabulated in table 5.2. The
value of resource utilization specified in table 5.2 are not fixed; it varies from time to time
depending upon the VM utilization and the programs running on them. After the execution of
privilege escalation attack, a runtime measurement has been performed to observe the resource
utilization of attacking VMs.
Table 5.1: Resource Allocation of Each VM.
Co-located VMs Memory (MB) Disk (GB) CPU (Hrs)
VM1 745.8482 6.25 709.45
VM2 937.6591 9.13 1054.764
VM3 3109.675 17.45 989.243
Table 5.2: One Week Resource Utilization of Each VM.
Co-located VMs Memory (MB) Disk (GB) CPU (Hrs)
VM1 1024 15 1
VM2 2048 25 2
VM3 3072 40 3
Figure 5.7 compares resource utilization of attacking VM before and after the implementation
of attack. Dash lines shows the resource utilization before attack. The main reason behind the
variation in resource utilization is that attacking VM uses ROP in order to escalate its privilege
level, hence it puts more processing load by executing the same set of code in its local memory.
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Figure 5.7: Resource Comparison of Attacking VM Before and After Attack
5.6 Attack on Microsoft Azure
The same attack could be evaluated on Azure System, Microsoft’s cross-cloud platform. Azure is
one of the leading public clouds. In experimental testbed, Azure is configured to be the underlying
IaaS provider. Azure offers unique cloud application hypervisor technology facilitating an enter-
prise and individuals to encapsulate completely and abstract an entire multi-VM application and
its environment so that it can run on any cloud (public or private) without any modifications.
5.6.1 Network Configuration
Azure allows to set up the network configuration for each of the VMs including static IPs. One
needs to assign the Static IP, Netmask, Gateway and DNS server for this interface. Azure support
the feature of SDN that automatically creates a virtual switch based on the IP address assigned
to VM and netmask of the interfaces. All interfaces that have same subnet are assigned to the
same virtual switch. If a gateway has been assigned at user interface, then its SDN will follow
the following properties:
1. The guest VM has assigned a Gateway IP (i.e one has configured the VM to serve as a
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Router), then Azure’s SDN will be working in accordance with the VM’s Gateway setting.
2. If in a case, the guest VM does not have a Gateway IP, Azure’s SDN will add a virtual
Router with the defined Gateway IP, and add it to the virtual switch.
3. If a default Gateway is not defined on Azure’s user interface, Azure’s SDN will simply do
nothing.
For this experiment, a simple network topology environment has been setup, by creating two
VMs say VM1, VM2 . Two NICs have been configured in each VMs and are separated from each
other. One VM (VM1) is root that resides in dom0, VM2 is an unprivileged VM and is residing in
domU. VM2 is an attacking VM, which is able to circumvent the security perimeter of cloud and
establish a connection with root domain i.e dom0 by exploiting a network channel as described in
section 5.2.1. VM3 can manage to control the Toolstack through which he may be able to add or
delete the target VMs.
An account has been created in Microsoft Azure. For testing purpose VM2 has been created in
MS-Azure. VM2 is the main working domain, where the experimentation of proposed attack has
been performed. Next step is to ssh into VM2. Now, two further sub-virtual machines are created
in the root account (VM2) say ’MyLinuxVM’ and ’MyWinVM’ as shown in Figure 5.8. Next step is
to login into one sub-VM "myLinuxVM" which is an attacking VM through ssh command.
Figure 5.8: Sub VM List
Figure 5.9: SSH to Sub-VM(attacking)
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The attacking machine, after implementing the attack methodology, is now running the delete
command on other co-located VMs as shown in Figure 5.10
Figure 5.10: Deleting Co-located VMs
Figure 5.10 depicts that non-root user is applying ’delete command’ that is under the privilege
of root user. In conclusion, the complete list of all co-located VMs are shown in Figure 5.11
Figure 5.11: List of All VMs After Attack
A summary has been tabulated in table 5.3 that exhibits the difference between different
cloud providers that are vulnerable to this attack.
5.7 Inhibiting the Network-Channel Attack
There is the prospect for favorable defences against the proposed attack, the pros and cons of
which are discussed here.
5.7.1 Network Channel Resistant Algorithm
The main defence strategy might pursue to modify the open source code of OpenStack cloud
to at least limit the granularity of network-based side-channels. The main phase that helps in
launching the experimented attack is to reuse the code so as to circumvent the security perimeter
and penetrate into the root domain of the system. This attack can be inhibited effectively by
thoroughly scrutinizing the code and restricting penetration into the current running system. A
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Table 5.3: Cloud Providers that are Vulnerable to This Attack
Sr. OpenStack AWS
1 Running instance can be
deleted directly
Instance must be stopped before deletion
2 – Stopped instance remains in the stack. one can restart it. It
starts working normally after restarting
3 No hierarchical struc-
ture is adopted
There is a hierarchical structure of AWS instances. They are
normally created on different layers, i.e EBS Volume, Net-
work, Elastic Load Balancing and Security Layers. Advantage:
- Before deleting the instance, it must be removed from layers.
4 – one cannot delete AWS instances by using the Amazon EC2
console or API because Amazon EC2 actions are not auto-
matically synchronized with AWS. One should delete AWS
instances only by using the AWS OpsWorks Stacks console or
API.
5 No Auto-healing concept
is applied
Every instance has an AWS OpsWorks Stacks agent that
communicates regularly with the service. AWS OpsWorks
Stacks uses that communication to monitor instance health.
If an agent does not communicate with the service for set time,
AWS OpsWorks Stacks considers the instance to have failed
and try to recover it by using the option of auto-healing.
new security perimeter has been introduced that defends the system in a way akin to a network
firewall. Figure 5.12 shows the code implementation that will check the xenapi connection.
The job of such security perimeter is to protect/block the unauthorized users for accessing
the root domain. The underneath logic of newly introduced security perimeter is to examine the
internal state of the code to identify the malicious connectivity of unauthorized users. Already
existing security rules cannot prevent such attacks because these codes are already stored in the
internal memory of the system, and security perimeter already examined such codes, so it treats
all of such codes equally and vetted. In order to expand the cloud network, the establishment
of root to root connection is required. Such connections are established through Xen special api
called xapi as explained above. The proposed security api upon connection request will internally
check xapi and ensure that whether is there any dual registration of this VM or not. If not, then
it will allow the connection otherwise it will be declined. A special api has been implemented
in the proposed security perimeter that will check at run time either this xapi has any xenapi
connection in its local domain or not? If it returns true, then its connection request would be
blocked otherwise connection will be granted. The only limitation of applying such security
perimeter is network delay. Figure 5.13a, shows the normal root-root connection in case of cloud
expansion. Figure 5.13b shows enabling of security check in case of root-root connection through
xapi. This security check will examine the internal code of xapi and then decide to allow or block
the connection. After the execution of security check API, Figure 5.14 shows the error while
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Figure 5.12: Searching of Xenapi in Xapi
accessing the root.
5.8 Discussion
This section discusses the major finding from the empirical evaluation of Privilege Escalation
using the RoP attack in this chapter.
• The purpose of this study is to investigate vulnerability in the configuration of a hypervisor
running underneath with leading open-source OpenStack cloud platform and commercial
cloud platform i.e. Microsoft Azure which an attacker can exploit.
• It was observed that strict network configuration is needed when permission for cloud
expansion is granted. Since network expansion using ROP is the main vulnerability which
an attacker can exploit and successfully penetrate itself by making an illegal connection
with the root domain.
• It was interesting to examine that this experimental setting can successfully control tool
stack of root domain from where it can manage or control other co-located VMs.
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Figure 5.13: Root-Root connections
Figure 5.14: Error While Accessing the Root
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• It was shown that this attack setting can be countered for exploitation by carefully examine
the request for a network connection from non-root VMs.
• Evaluation criteria (Section 5.3) has been addressed as:
Functional qualitative parameter, the attack methodology is evaluated to check whether
it accomplishes all the tasks for which it is designed. Their functional parameter is eval-
uated by looking at its inference ability as shown in Figure 5.2 in which all these attack
strategies have shown to be implemented successfully. The results showed that all the
events were inferred. Moreover, the evaluation showed that the attack model fulfilled the
functional purpose.
Expressiveness in the context of this study, is defined as how well Privilege escalation
attack works the full range of tasks when used within the network domain. The expressive
parameter is evaluated by looking at the results in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 which shows
a non-root VM is performing the operation of root-VM, which indicates strong evidence
about the working of attack.
From the evaluation of the results, it is demonstrated that the major strength of the
presented approach is its ability to make an illegal connections with the root domain
and control tool stack. However, the approach works well on XEN architecture and does
not cover other hypervisors such as KVM, VMWare which is the main limitation of this
approach.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter, the exploitation of return-oriented programming (ROP) technique has been
presented. This exploitation leads to a privilege escalation attack on xen hypervisor by breaking
a domain isolation between root and non-root VMs. Existing attacks using ROP have targeted
the applications, libc library and operating systems, but never experiment the exploitation of
network channel through code reusing. Because of the pervasive nature of virtualization, it
is thus significant that its domain isolation properties are further needed to be explored and
understood. This study mainly deals with the isolation properties (or lack thereof) of a leading
open source virtual machine manager (OpenStack) and commercial MS-Azure. Challenges that
overcome to execute this attack entails privilege escalation, ROP, difficulty of penetration into
the root domain of running system.
Through a combination of these different novel approaches, a new attack model has been
assembled that was sufficiently influential in controlling the victim VM. The empirical evalua-
tion of privilege escalation shows that it successfully breaches the security perimeter of cloud
providers. It is especially important to note that the exploitation of return oriented programming
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(ROP) produces very high risk in almost all the configurations discussed in this chapter. Counter-
measure solution has also been proposed by directly modifying the open source code of leading
cloud platform i.e OpenStack. In summary, the overall approach described in the experimental
evaluation is able to address the research challenges and the the objective of the research have
been met to a great extent.
The next chapter summarizes the research work presented in this thesis and highlights the
main contributions. It also discusses open research problems in the area and outlines a number










CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Summary
The objective of work presented in this thesis is to explore a new vulnerability in the exist-ing network architecture of cloud computing can be exploited. Additionally, introductionof novel cross-VM attacks along with their empirical analysis and characterization in
leading cloud computing architecture has been presented. The countermeasure solutions of these
attacks have also been proposed. The analytical need of leading cloud systems, and their benefits
for improving research and technical process within the cloud computing area are discussed in
detail. Particularly, this study presents an investigation and technique to illustrate the architec-
tural components within the cloud computing environment. These investigations are leveraged
for applied usage, including exploitation of network channel, impersonation of regular network
card, RoP in conjunction with network channel, privilege escalation of non-root users, and have
further been used to improve security perimeter of Cloud system.
6.2 Overview of Thesis
This section highlights the major findings of this thesis in a nutshell.
Chapter 2 highlighted the concept of the system model and its different components, as well as
the development of the modern distributed system to cloud computing. The model and taxonomy
of cloud computing is discussed in detail, including deployment models, service models and attack
vectors. The concept of security, and how it can be used to enhance cloud computing research is
explored and discussed in detail. It is exposed that while cloud isolation in a shared environment
is an active research area, still there is a challenge in assessing its security and privacy. Next,
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the idea of system architectural model and how it can be used to enhance cloud computing
security is demonstrated. The current state-of-the-art in investigation for Cloud components are
presented and discussed in detail, and current gaps in the literature are identified. Finally, the
significance and applicability of Cloud analytics is presented, including a discussion on how it
can be used to improve Cloud practical and commercial operation. This chapter demonstrated
the gap in exploitation of network channel, which is the main contribution of thesis, through the
combination of impersonation and Linux regular tool.
Chapter 3 focuses on the network architecture of cloud model. This chapter includes the
description of the system model, components, its configurations and different service models and
advance network features along with their limitations used within the open source and commer-
cial cloud system. Additionally, the analysis infrastructure - consists of how the network traffic
comes in and goes out of the system – show the inner network devices used in communication.
This chapter concludes by presenting an overview the network architecture, their service model
that are used to implement isolation and network devices that are used in leading cloud model
through which network traffic of all co-located VMs passes.
Chapter 4 demonstrates the execution of cross-VM network channel attack in leading open
source and commercial cloud platforms i.e. OpenStack and Oracle Ravello System. The exe-
cuted attack applied an innovative strategy by doing a combination of impersonating a TAP
interface and constructing a network mirror in the bridge interface, where the network traffic
of all co-located VMs passes. This successful experimental setting allows the attackers to com-
promise the privacy of co-located VMs by redirecting their network traffic at set destination
point, which is under the control of attacker. This study will likely leave little to no trace on
the cloud infrastructure as attacking VM is not violating the resource limit allocated by cloud
provider and removes all the footprints. This chapter also presents an empirical analysis of
cloud setup, their configurations, limitations and mitigation strategy to appraise the attack
in real-time scenario. The objective of the experiment was to exploit the underlying network
channel to observe the network traffic of co-located VMs. The graph result shows the resources
consumption by the attacking machine. This attack is challenging in the sense that the attacking
VM can consume resources within an assigned limit and does not violate any resource utilization
factor. At the end, we have also investigated how to overcome the challenges of distinguish-
ing between normal resource patterns and target attacks from VMs. Countermeasure solution
has also been presented in terms of modification in open source code of a cloud platform that
prohibited the connection of any external device without proper parameter defined by cloud model.
Chapter 5 presents another innovative study that escalates the privilege level of non-root user
and the empirical evaluation of this attack when it successfully breaches the security perimeter
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of cloud providers. In cloud model, domains have been defined to identify the privilege level of
users, i.e root and non-root user. Normally, root users reside in dom0 and non-root users are in
domU. Root users from dom0 can manage all non-root users from domU. In this chapter, it has
been shown that how a non-root user can escape from domU and make a connection with dom0
and being a non-root user can perform the task of root user. In doing this, the attacking machine
used RoP which is already running code in the memory of cloud platform in conjunction with
network channel. Analysis of results shows that such an attack is a serious threat in different
cloud settings discussed in this chapter. At the end, countermeasure solution has been presented
that modify the open source code of leading cloud platform i.e. OpenStack.
6.3 Major Findings
The main findings of this research have been to investigate the exploitation of cross-VM settings
in the network architecture of the cloud model. The thesis has adopted a mixed-methods approach
involving a literature review and the development of experimental methods that deal with real-
time setups. This has led to the following contributions.
6.3.1 TAP Impersonation and Mirroring
This thesis provides some key insights into the network architecture of the cloud computing
model and the particular challenges associated with this area of science. In particular, this thesis
has identified:
• The importance of the concept of network architecture in cloud computing as it applies to
VM’s network traffic flow. In cloud computing networking, there exists a large number of
small, heterogeneous and potentially complex network devices that are usually involved in
the network traffic flow of VMs.
• Designing a zero-day attack named TAP Impersonation and Mirroring in a modern cloud
computing model that can successfully redirect the network traffic of other co-located VMs.
But to successfully launch this attack some key challenges need to be addressed.
• Five key challenges associated with this attack have been highlighted that make this area
quite distinct from the other attacks and which demand a different security response. These
challenges are i) Deeply investigating the existing network architecture of cloud computing.
ii) penetrating the current network system iii) preempting the network traffic of other
co-located VMs. iv) redirection of network traffic of co-location VM at destination point
v) elimination of all footprints of attack by hiding all the devices used in launching this
attack.
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• Additionally, countermeasure strategy is also presented that potentially seems to block
these attack strategies for execution in the modern cloud system.
6.3.2 Privilege Escalation using RoP in conjunction with Network Channel
The thesis also contributes insights into current practices of hypervisor architecture in cross-VM
settings, including important exploitation of privilege escalation using RoP. Some of the insights
that have emerged from this work include:
• The practices of conventional privilege escalation attack strategy are insufficient and suffer
from methodological limitation (old technologies) and are easily countered, because of the
advance security feature of the cloud computing model.
• The presented attack is dealing key challenges associated with the escalation of privilege
level entails i) efficiently usage of RoP ii) penetration into the root domain through non-root
domain by using exploitation of RoP in conjunction with network channel iii) control tool
stack to manage other VMs.
• The consequence of this attack is so alarming that it can jeopardize other co-located VMs
in terms of their data and resources.
• Countermeasure solution of this attack is also presented that disallow illegal connection
from non-root VMs.
6.4 Revisiting the Research Goals
The main contributions of the thesis are reviewed by revisiting the research goals set in Section
1.3.1. It should now be apparent that there is a strong mapping between the contributions and
the initial research questions which are as:
1. Investigating the network architecture and their associated components for designing a
zero-day attack model to exploit a vulnerability in the network architecture of the cloud
computing model.
The first goal has been achieved by designing a TAP Impersonation and mirroring
attack model as discussed in Chapter 4.
2. The investigation of return-oriented programming (RoP) and associated techniques for the
exploitation of hypervisor, and identifying strengths and limitations of this approach.
The second goal has been delivered by the Privilege Escalation attack which is im-
plemented by the exploitation of RoP in conjunction with network channel as detailed in
Chapter 5.
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3. Evaluate the overall approach through real-world scenarios derived from the analysis of
literature and to propose a mitigation solution.
The third goal has been accomplished by the Evaluation and Mitigation strategies as
explained in Section 4.8 and 5.7.
6.5 Future Work
This section discusses some of the future directions in which research can progress on the basis
of findings in this thesis.
6.5.1 Implementation of Cloud Model on Mobile Platforms
In cloud platform, there are various cloud providers which are shifted into mobile platforms. A
potential future work is to implement the executed attack on mobile infrastructure. It cannot
be denied that the advent of mobile applications have also introduced new horizon which are
vulnerable to attacks. Contextual information such as location, plays a greater role when the
user is using app or sharing information on mobile platforms. It has already been shown that
co-location is itself a serious threat. The first step of attacking machine is to co-locate with the
target. A possible future work can be to extend the design of mobile applications to save the
privacy of users data.
6.5.2 RoP on KVM or other VMM
RoP has been proved to be a severe threat on cloud model. RoP was experimented in OpenStack
which is an open source cloud platform having xen running underneath. Future work may focus
on KVM or some other hypervisor in cloud model. As all hypervisors have their own configurations
and settings, so the exploitation of hypervisor requires some different illusions.
6.5.3 Analysis Extension
The analysis presented within this thesis could be extended to explore a number of additional
system settings. Extension of workload models , as stated in chapter 5, analyzing VMs are
selected on the basis of resource utilization. It is possible for analyzing the VMs on the basis of
individual tasks. Future work may involve applying the described workload analysis method to
find out the attacking machine characteristics and behaviour when compared with individual
tasks. Furthermore, the workload model does not contain the development limitations of tasks
onto servers, which can also be included to study the behaviour of attacking machine as compared
to non-constrained tasks.
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6.6 Concluding Remarks
The work presented in this thesis identifies the problems of traffic redirection of target machine
and privilege escalation which leads to the privacy breaches for co-located VMs in the cloud
model. The main contribution of this thesis is impersonation attack, which redirects real-time
network traffic of other co-locateed VMs, and privilege escalation which uses RoP to exploit
network-channel. These attacks are implemented in real time on open source and commercial
cloud platform configured with different security requirements. The evaluation of these attacks
presented in this thesis shows the loophole in the network channel of cloud architecture, which
an attacking machine can exploit. As part of this implementation process, careful attention shall
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